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CLINTON COUNTY COMMISSIONERS V. EPA: CLOSING
OFF A ROUTE TO PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW
Karen M. Hoffinan*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you live near an abandoned chemical plant. The plant had
manufactured solvents and, apparently, a large volume of those sol-
vents were either spilled onto or leaked into the ground while the
plant was in operation. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) recently added the plant site to the National Priorities List
(NPL),1 a listing of high-priority hazardous waste cleanup sites, thus
recognizing it as an environmental hazard. In accordance with the re-
quirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),2 the EPA studied the site
and proposed a cleanup method: burning the contaminated soil. The
EPA published the proposed plan and received negative comments on
it, namely allegations that the remedial method would release toxins
into the air and harm the health of people like yourself living near the
site. These comments recommended that the EPA implement an al-
ternative remedial action that would clean up the site just as effec-
tively, but without the negative effects on the public health.
Imagine that the EPA ignores these negative comments and orders
past owners of the chemical plant to implement the proposed reme-
dial method. You become suspicious of the EPA's motives in ordering
this cleanup method, and do some investigating. You uncover a finan-
cial relationship between the EPA official supervising the cleanup at
the site and the company owning the hazardous waste incinerator that
will most likely be used in the planned cleanup process.
Now imagine that when you try to get an injunction in federal court
to stop the implementation of the remedial activity, you are told the
court does not have jurisdiction to hear your case until the cleanup, or
at least a distinct portion of it, is completed. By then, you and your
neighbors will already be exposed to the toxic fumes from the
cleanup, and it will be too late for a court to grant any meaningful
relief.
Hopefully, this nightmarish scenario will remain just that-a
nightmare. Yet, under current law, this is exactly how courts would
respond to such a problem if they continue to interpret the CERCLA
citizen suit provision as they do now. Furthermore, there is nothing in
* I would like to thank Professor Nicholas Johnson for his invaluable guidance
on this Note.
1. See infra note 176 for an explanation of the NPL
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
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the law to prevent the EPA or its officials from acting under similar
conflicts of interests.
In Clinton County Commissioners v. EPA,3 the Third Circuit re-
viewed a case in which the district court allowed subject matter juris-
diction over citizen groups' claims challenging a planned EPA-
selected remedial activity4 at the Drake Chemical Company site in
Loch Haven, Pennsylvania.5 The Third Circuit held that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim, and dis-
missed the suit.6 In doing so, the court overruled its earlier decision in
United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc.,7 which allowed judicial
review of incomplete EPA remedial actions whenever a challenge in-
cludes bona fide allegations of irreparable harm to public health or
the environment.8
The Third Circuit's decision in Clinton County is in line with every
other circuit court of appeals that has addressed this issue.9 The deci-
sion is supported by one goal of CERCLA, to clean up contaminated
sites as quickly as possible.' ° The broader goal of CERCLA, how-
ever, is to protect the public from the dangers of environmental con-
tamination." The EPA and courts are not fulfilling this broader goal
3. 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Arrest the Incinerator
Remediation, Inc. v. EPA, 118 S. Ct. 687 (1998).
4. See infra notes 117 & 120 and accompanying text for definitions of "remedy"
and "remedial action."
5. Clinton County Comm'rs, 116 F.3d at 1022.
6. Id. at 1022-23.
7. 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994), overruled by Clinton County Comm'rs, 116 F.3d at
1018.
8. Id. at 149. While both Princeton Gamma-Tech and Clinton County talk about
irreparable harm to public health and the environment, this Note will focus mainly on
the health hazards posed by inadequate cleanups. Hazardous site cleanups face an-
other series of problems concerning what standards are sufficient to define a site as
"clean" following remediation (how clean is clean). Michael P. Healy, Judicial Review
and CERCLA Response Actions: Interpretive Strategies in the Face of Plain Meaning,
17 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1993). States, rather than the EPA, play the main role
in determining cleanliness standards. Id. Healy concludes that courts have no juris-
diction over citizens suits which claim that the applicable cleanup standards are inade-
quate. Id. at 47. This Note does not discuss that type of claim.
9. See, e.g., Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1484
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that CERCLA's timing of review provision did not deprive
citizen groups of due process); Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution
Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that CERCLA
only permitted challenges to removal and remedial actions that had already occurred
before suit was filed); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1990) (indicating
that a federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider challenges to
remedial actions that have not been taken); Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557
(11th Cir. 1989) (ruling that no action may be brought to compel compliance with
provisions of CERCLA until the remedial action is actually taken).
10. Jackson B. Battle & Maxine I. Lipeles, Hazardous Waste 180 (2d ed. 1993).
11. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
1940 [Vol. 66
PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW
by requiring potentially responsible parties (PRPs)12 to perform reme-
dial methods with environmentally damaging side effects. Congress
has recognized the danger of a strict ban on pre-enforcement review, 3
and several congressional proposals to reform CERCLA contain pro-
visions eliminating the ban on pre-enforcement review. 4
The Third Circuit's opinion in Clinton County strongly relies on the
EPA's ability to select the proper remedial methods. 5 The court
failed to consider that the EPA may not have fully examined alterna-
tive methods or the negative impacts of the method it ultimately re-
quires. Additionally, in an extreme case, the EPA's remedial plan
selection may have resulted from a conflict of interest, which could
cause harm to the public.'6 The rationale underlying the Clinton
County decision sheds new insight on why the courts are misinter-
preting CERCLA. The courts are too strongly relying on the EPA,
and reluctant to sway from a strict interpretation of CERCLA.'7 As
noted above, though, the EPA may not always be so trustworthy.
Thus, in extreme cases, where a bona fide claim of irreparable harm
stemming from a conflict of interest is alleged, the courts should re-
turn to a rationale similar to the one expressed in Princeton Gamma-
Tech, and allow review in those situations.
This Note will examine the state of pre-enforcement review after
Clinton County and suggest a judicial exception for extraordinary situ-
ations. Part I provides a brief overview of the EPA. Part II presents a
look at the history of CERCLA. Part III introduces CERCLA's tim-
ing of review provision, section 113(h). It then analyzes various judi-
cial interpretations of section 113(h), noting the trends in cases where
irreparable harm is alleged. Finally, part IV proposes a solution for
allowing limited judicial review of extraordinary situations. It criti-
ques proposed solutions that focus exclusively on irreparable harm,
and suggests some necessary modifications to that type of solution.
This Note concludes that the courts should modify their interpretation
of CERCLA's timing of review section, to allow pre-enforcement re-
12. The PRPs include all past and present owners, and others that may have been
involved in moving hazardous materials to or from the site. See infra note 137 and
accompanying text.
13. Lucia Ann Silecchia, Judicial Review of CERCLA Cleanup Procedures: Strik-
ing a Balance to Prevent Irreparable Harm, 20 Harv. Envtl. L Rev. 339, 392-94 (1996)
(noting that both the House and Senate proposed bills which would remove a strict
ban on pre-enforcement review).
14. See Reform of Superfund Act of 1995, H.R. 2500, 104th Cong.; Accelerated
Cleanup & Envtl. Restoration Act of 1995, S. 1285, 104th Cong. (amended 1996); see
also Silecchia's proposal discussed in part IV, infra.
15. Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1028-29 (3d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied sub nom. Arrest the Incinerator Remediation, Inc. v. EPA, 118 S. Ct. 687
(1998); see infra Part III.C.
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part III.B.
1998] 1941
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
view when faced with a narrow, clearly defined group of
circumstances.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE EPA
This section looks at the creation of the EPA, noting its unique sta-
tus within the federal government. The section also discusses the po-
tential for economic and political influence in light of past conflicts of
interest within the EPA.
A. Creation of the EPA
The EPA was created in 1970, in response to increasing environ-
mental problems and political pressure to respond to those
problems."8 The Agency was expected to "rationaliz[e] the organiza-
tion of environmental efforts, and giv[e] focus and coordination to
them."' 19 This approach was especially important for problems such as
toxic waste20 management and acid rain,21 "which cut across the vari-
ous environmental media (i.e., air, soil, and water)".22
18. Marc K. Landy et al., The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the
Wrong Questions 31-33 (expanded ed. 1994). In 1970, Sen. Edmund Muskie, a
staunch environmentalist, was a leading contender for the 1972 Democratic nomina-
tion for president. Id. at 28. Muskie had established himself as the "nation's pre-
eminent designer of environmental policy." Id. at 27. President Nixon, running for re-
election, wanted the support of environmentally oriented voters. Id. at 30. His sup-
port of creating an environmental agency was based on a compromise between the
conflicting goals of appeasing environmentalists and keeping the environmental regu-
lators in check. Id.
The media also played an important role in the creation of the EPA. Id. at 23-24.
Environmental stories, for example, of oil covered birds and rusting storage drums,
had visual interest, strong story lines, and viewer identification. Id. at 24. This helped
heighten the public's interest in the environment, and to bring it to the political fore-
front. Id.
19. Richard A. Harris & Sidney M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change: A
Tale of TWo Agencies 228 (1989) (quoting Douglas Costle) (citation omitted). Many
already-existing agencies were consolidated into the newly-created EPA: The Federal
Water Quality Administration and the Office of Research on Effects of Pesticides on
Wildlife and Fish from the Department of the Interior; the Bureau of Water Hygiene,
the Bureau of Solid Waste Management, the National Air Pollution Control Adminis-
tration, the Bureau of Radiological Health, and the Office of Pesticides Research
from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW); the Pesticides Regu-
lation Division from the Department of Agriculture; the Division of Radiation Stan-
dards from the Atomic Energy Commission; and the Interagency Federal Radiation
Council. Landy et al., supra note 18, at 33.
20. A toxic waste is a poisonous substance which is capable of killing, injuring, or
otherwise impairing a living organism. The intrinsic properties used to define toxic
materials are materials that cause cancer, DNA mutations, or birth defects. Charles
A. Wentz, Hazardous Waste Management 36, 93 (1989).
21. Acid rain is caused by the emission of sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxides from
the combustion of fossil fuels. Robert H. Boyle & R. Alexander Boyle, Acid Rain 11
(1983). It kills fish and aquatic life, and endangers drinking water. Id. at 14-15.
22. Harris & Milkis, supra note 19, at 229.
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The EPA was created as a quasi-independent agency, isolating it
from presidential control.' This configuration allowed the Agency to
be dominated by technical and scientific experts rather than politi-
cians and lawyers.24 The EPA's early focus was on enforcement, how-
ever, and the public perception has been that the EPA is lacking in
technical skill.?5 The theory of executive-legislative relations within
the EPA was described by Richard Ayres, attorney for the National
Resources Defense Council:
Congress has delegated powers along a continuum. At one end, the
President has vast discretion, with little review .... at the other,
where sound policymaking requires expert knowledge, where deci-
sions need to be insulated from political interference, and where the
exercise of judicial review requires safeguarding the integrity and
fairness of the record on which the agency acts, his control over the
agencies is far more circumscribed.
The writing of regulations by quasi-independent agencies such as
EPA, whose powers are explicitly delegated to them by the Con-
gress, whose judgments require great technical knowledge, and
whose actions are subject to judicial review, falls near the latter end
of this continuum. 2
6
Thus, the EPA bureaucrats enjoyed an absence of scrutiny atypical of
most federal departments.27
This lack of scrutiny by the executive and legislative branches sug-
gests that the courts should review EPA actions. In practice, however,
judicial review does not always occur. For example, the Clinton
County court's decision was based on an underlying assumption that
the EPA's decision and its selected remedies were sound.' In justify-
ing its conclusion not to allow pre-enforcement judicial review of
claims alleging irreparable harm, the court rejected the possibility that
the EPA may have made a mistake in selecting the remedial solu-
tion.29 The court also rejected the possibility that EPA conflicts of
23. Landy et al., supra note 18, at 33.
24. Harris & Milkis, supra note 19, at 230.
25. Landy et al., supra note 18, at 35-36.
26. Executive Branch Review of Environmental Regulations: Hearings before the
Subcomn. on Environmental Pollution of the Conmn. on Environment and Public
Works, 96th Cong. 30-31 (1979) (statement of Richard Ayres, attorney for the Na-
tional Resources Defense Council). For a thorough discussion of why the judiciary is
better suited to review EPA actions, see part IV.B.1, infra.
27. Landy et al., supra note 18, at 34.
28. Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1028-29 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied
sub nom. Arrest the Incinerator Remediation, Inc. v. EPA, 118 S. Ct. 687 (1998); see
supra note 15 and accompanying text. Indeed most courts tend to defer to the EPA's
presumed expertise, mainly because of "the highly technical nature of site evaluation,
ARARs identification, and remedy selection." Battle & Upeles, supra note 10, at 381-
82. But see United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (adopting
the defendants' proposed containment remedy over the EPA's preferred excavation
remedy after a lengthy battle of experts).
29. See Clinton County Comm'rs, 116 F.3d at 1025-26.
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interest could have been the impetus behind the remedial plan se-
lected.3" The court hid this blind reliance on the EPA behind the con-
gressional intent to avoid delay in implementing cleanup processes. 3'
Their basic argument was that these allegations of irreparable harm,
"while 'bona fide,' may simply reflect a legitimate difference of opin-
ion about the preferred remedy for a particular site."' 32 Nowhere in
the opinion does the court concede that the EPA is capable of making
mistakes, which they clearly have, as evidenced by their failure to fol-
low procedures in earlier cleanup projects.33 Additionally, the Clinton
County court does not admit that the EPA is capable of overlooking
an adverse health effect or colluding with PRPs in choosing remedial
methods. 34
B. Historical Look at the EPA Under Past Administrations
Events over the past fifteen years demonstrate that putting com-
plete trust in the EPA is not necessarily appropriate.35 In 1983, for
example, over twenty top EPA and Department of Interior (DOI) of-
ficials were accused of letting political considerations and ties to regu-
lated industries influence their actions.36 Cleanups were stalled and
Superfund money withheld from at least two infamous sites. 37 The
House Judiciary Committee findings on this incident noted many con-
flicts of interest in EPA and DOI activities. 38 For example, two repre-
sentatives who were involved in the House of Representatives probe
of the EPA had been examining hazardous waste dumpers at sites
within their constituencies and matching them against campaign con-
tributor lists. 39 In another instance, former Superfund program ad-
ministrator Rita Lavelle improperly participated in the toxic waste
case at the Stringfellow Acid Pits site, in which her former employer
was involved as a PRP.4 ° In these cases, the "delays in initiating
cleanup measures increased significantly the risks of adverse health
effects to thousands of people. ' 41 In an egregious example of manipu-
30. See id.
31. See id. at 1027.
32. See id. at 1024.
33. See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990); see also infra note 236.
34. See Clinton County Comm'rs, 116 F.3d at 1025-26.
35. Jacqueline Vaughn Switzer, Environmental Politics: Domestic and Global
Dimensions 14-18 (1994) (discussing the environmental woes that plagued the country
in the past two decades).
36. Gregory Gordon, Washington News, UPI, Nov. 14, 1985, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File.
37. EPA Officials 'Violated Trust' by 'Manipulating the Superfimd', Wash. Post,
Aug. 31, 1984, at A16 [hereinafter EPA Officials] (discussing excerpts from the House
Energy Oversight subcommittee report on the EPA controversy).
38. See id.
39. Howard Kurtz & Mary Thornton, Probe is Sought of Justice Department in
EPA Dispute, Wash. Post, Dec. 6, 1985, at Al.
40. Id.
41. EPA Officials, supra note 37, at A16.
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lating the Superfund for political gain, the EPA withheld Superfund
grant money at the Stringfellow Acid Pits site in California because of
political conflicts in the 1982 gubernatorial election.42 The Reagan
Administration did not want incumbent democratic Governor Ed-
mund Brown, Jr. to get credit for cleanup of the site and thus delayed
granting cleanup funds until after the election.43 Many individuals
were forced to resign, most notably Secretary of the Interior James
Watt and EPA Administrator Ann Burford.' Lavelle was indicted for
lying under oath about the her participation in the toxic waste case
affecting her former employer, and served four and one-half months
in prison for perjury.'a
Conflicts of interest such as those Lavelle maintained in the String-
fellow Acid Pits site may also stem from financial situations. For ex-
ample, in 1991, Vice President Dan Quayle and senior aide Allan
Hubbard faced a conflict of interest probe by the House Energy and
Commerce Subcommittee on Health and Environment.46 Quayle was
actively involved in terminating an EPA proposal that would have re-
quired 25 percent of the recyclable materials in municipal waste com-
bustors to be separated prior to incineration. 7 Congressional staff
reported that, at the time, Quayle owned $350,000 of stock in Central
Newspapers, Inc., a company which strongly opposed mandatory re-
cycling of paper.' Hubbard was half-owner of World Wide Chemi-
cals, Inc. of Indianapolis, and participated in a White House review of
Clean Air Act Amendment (CAAA) proposals. 49 This situation sug-
gests that Hubbard's review of the CAAAs was based on making the
new regulations advantageous for the chemical industry, not most ef-
fective for the environment. While there was no evidence that either
Quayle or Hubbard were motivated by concern for their personal as-
42. Id.
43. Mary Thornton, U.S. Officials' Talk on Lavelle Probed, Wash. Post, Oct. 7,
1984, at Al; Michael Weisskopf, Toxic-Waste Site Awash in Misjudgment; Deadly
Chemicals Seep Into Town's Water Supply Despite Superfuid, Wash. Post, Nov. 16,
1986, at Al.
44. Thornton, supra note 43, at A18; Editorial, Lobbies Claim Another Victim, The
Daily Oklahoman, Oct. 11, 1983, available in 1983 WL 2169916.
45. Thornton, supra note 43, at A18. The House Energy Oversight Subcommit-
tee's investigation of the situation was impeded by several circumstances, including
President Reagan's claim of executive privilege over "'enforcement sensitive"
Superfund documents, Lavelle's refusal to testify before the subcommittee, and La-
velle and her staff's unlawful removal and concealment of documents from EPA offi-
cial files. Id.
46. Waxman Explores Conflict of Interest Questions Surrounding Quayle, Top
Aide, Solid Waste Report, Dec. 16, 1991, available in 1991 WL 2698523 [hereinafter
Waxman Explores].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Dingell Finally Gets Docunents Involving OMB, Quayle Council, Hazardous
Waste News, Feb. 3, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2665624.
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sets," these incidents suggest that bias and self-serving behavior is
possible.5
Several other conflict of interest situations have occurred within the
past decade. In 1986, the EPA awarded contracts for research and
testing at their Duluth, Minnesota, Environmental Research Labora-
tory to AScI Corporation, which was wholly-owned by an EPA em-
ployee at the time.52 These contracts were worth more than $14.5
million.53 According to a draft report from the EPA Inspector Gen-
eral, "[u]nder these contracts, EPA has paid AScI hundreds of
thousands of dollars for such 'scientific' work as snow shoveling, office
painting and remodeling, and repairing lawn equipment, a pickup
truck and even toilets. This is yet another egregious example in the
mushrooming revelations of contract mismanagement at EPA. 54
In 1993, EPA Deputy Administrator Robert Sussman's actions were
questioned in connection with his decisions regarding permitting new
carbon injectors at a Waste Technologies Industries (WTI) facility in
East Liverpool, Ohio.5 He granted WTI "temporary authorization"
to install the carbon injectors on its hazardous waste incinerator dur-
ing, not after, the 60-day public comment period.56 This type of situa-
tion is highly unusual, and may have been influenced by his previous
work as an attorney for the Chemical Manufacturers Association
(CMA). 57 Certain members of the CMA, including industrial giants
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., Inc. and BASF AG, had contracts to
supply waste to WTI.58
The Clinton Administration had conflict of interest problems in the
WTI situation as well. During the Clinton-Gore campaign in 1992, Al
Gore criticized WTI's proposed incinerator because it was set to oper-
ate in a residential area in Ohio, a few hundred yards from an elemen-
tary school.59 The incinerator failed the trial burn and the Ohio
Attorney General found that WTI did not have a valid permit to oper-
ate at that site.6° Only two months after being elected, however, Gore
started supporting the incinerator.6 The Seattle Times suggested sev-
50. Waxman Explores, supra note 46.
51. Id.
52. Dingell Pledges Hearing; Contract Mismanagement Revealed, Pesticide &
Toxic Chem. News, June 3, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2681948.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Paul Kemezis, EPA OKs Modifications at Controversial WTI Facility, Env.
Week, July 15, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2742388.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Jeff Cohen & Norman Solomon, Sure, Al Gore is Green; So is the Color of
Money, Seattle Times, Nov. 6, 1993, at All.
60. Greenpeace Calls Incinerator Approval Illegal, Irresponsible, Pesticide & Toxic
Chem. News, July 14, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2757946.
61. Cohen & Solomon, supra note 59, at All.
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eral reasons for his change of heart.62 Jackson Stephens, founder of
WTI, donated $100,000 to the Clinton-Gore campaign in 1992.63 Ste-
phens was also the chair of Stephens Inc., an investment firm based in
Little Rock which was a major underwriter of Clinton's candidacy.'
The campaign deposited up to $55 million in federal election funds in
a bank partially owned by Stephens.65 In addition, Robert Sussman,
the EPA administrator who granted the temporary approval for WTI
to operate, was a law school classmate of Bill and Hillary Clinton.6'
An overarching conflict of interest occurs when the EPA adminis-
ters Superfund cleanups of federal hazardous waste sites.67 This in-
herent conflict of interest stems from the interrelationship between
the party performing the cleanup and the party ordering the
cleanup.' Cleanups are conducted by one department of the Execu-
tive Branch (in many cases the Department of Energy or Defense),
and are supervised by another governmental agency, the EPA, with no
outside review of the cleanup. 69 As one commentator criticizes, "re-
fusal to review challenges brought under other federal environmental
laws gives the Executive broad, unreviewable authority to conduct
cleahups of sites for which it is a potentially liable party."7 o Some
state officials advocate giving full oversight authority for the cleanup
of federal facilities to the states.71 As noted by Christopher Jones,
chief of the Environmental Enforcement Section in the Ohio Attor-
ney General's office, federal agencies have "'overwhelming credibility
problems' because of an inherent conflict of interest and a 'demon-
strably poor record of environmental compliance." '72
C. Political Nature of the EPA
In addition to concerns regarding conflicts of interest, the structure
of the EPA within the federal government creates questions of undue
political influence on cleanup plan proposals. As noted above, the
EPA is an independent agency within the Executive Branch of the
federal government.73 The unique structure of the Agency gives it
62. Id.
63. Id
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. States Ready to Take Over Superfivd, Worried About Costs, Pesticide & Toxic
Chem. News, May 10, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8217876 [hereinafter States Ready].
Federal hazardous waste sites are simply sites owned and operated by the federal
government that are contaminated with hazardous waste. Id.
68. Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Superfund Colloquium: Challenges to Federal Facility
Cleanups and CERCLA Section 113(h), 8 Tul. Envtl. LJ. 353, 355 (1995).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. States Ready, supra note 67.
72. Id.
73. Switzer, supra note 35, at 53.
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heightened accountability to the White House and Congress. 74 This
increased accountability creates the highly politicized nature of the
EPA. In performing its functions, it has been suggested that the
EPA's "leadership should try to ascertain how its mission fits with that
of the overall administration program and articulate its activities with
the rest of the president's team."7 Protection of the environment has
been a priority when it is a focus of the President, and has lapsed
when other interests have predominated.76
The EPA's performance under the Reagan Administration is illus-
trative of this theme. Candidate Reagan's environmental agenda 77
stressed the desire to ensure that the costs of regulation were justified
by their benefits.78 This view did not receive much public support.
After Reagan's election, the EPA suffered large budget cuts to sup-
port the Administration's economic plan to reduce taxes and the defi-
cit.79 From 1981, when President Reagan took office, until 1983, the
EPA's budget was slashed by 48 percent.80 Many of President Rea-
gan's key appointees were known to be enemies of environmental-
ists.8 Additionally, the EPA was reorganized to become more
subordinate to the President." All of these factors led to increased
deregulation of the environment. Although the EPA introduced
Superfund under the Reagan Administration, the Reagan EPA was
highly criticized because progress in selecting and cleaning up sites
was slow and cleanup levels settled upon were insufficient.8 3 As Les-
lie Dach, legislative director for pollution issues at the National Audu-
74. Alfred A. Marcus, Promise and Performance: Choosing and Implementing an
Environmental Policy 175-77 (1980) (noting EPA's single administrator, not a group
of commissioners, gives it heightened accountability to the President, while its height-
ened accountability to Congress stems from the structure of its statutes, which give
the EPA the authority to achieve specific goals by definite dates).
75. Landy et al., supra note 18, at 16.
76. Switzer, supra note 35, at 69.
77. Reagan revealed this environmental agenda in his 1980 presidential campaign.
Landy et al., supra note 18, at 245.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 246.
80. Melinda Beck, The Toxic-Waste Crisis, Newsweek, Mar. 7, 1983, at 20, 21.
81. Landy et al., supra note 18, at 246. For example, James Watt, Secretary of the
Interior, was counsel for the Mountain States Legal Foundation, a conservative public
interest law firm that spearheaded efforts to block environmental regulation. Id. John
Daniel, EPA Administrator Gorsuch's chief of staff, had recently served as a lobbyist
for Johns-Manville, the Denver-based firm most well known as a manufacturer of
asbestos products. Id. at 247.
82. Id. at 248. For example, Reagan created the cabinet councils, a device to facili-
tate Executive Branch integration. Id. These councils worked on any key policy ques-
tions that transcended any single department. Id. The Cabinet Council on Natural
Resources discussed many issues which overlapped with the EPA's jurisdiction, but
the EPA Administrator, lacking cabinet status, was not a member of the council. Id.
83. Id. at 265-66. Some complain that the EPA lets firms off too easily by waiving
future liability and settling for only cursory cleanups. Beck, supra note 80, at 21.
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bon Society, succinctly noted: "'They addressed a small percentage of
sites and did a poor job."'"
The Bush Administration was also criticized for its lack of environ-
mental concern. The Sierra Club and a professor from Evergreen
State University severely criticized the actions the Bush Administra-
tion took to interfere with the work of environmental scientists.'s
Their research showed a "pervasive and continuing willingness to in-
terfere at every step of the scientific process to thwart outcomes con-
trary to [the administration's] ideology and political commitments."'
For example, the Bush Administration sought to use the Arctic Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge for oil drilling. 7 The DOI originally produced
a study which showed a 19 percent chance of finding economically
recoverable oil in the coastal plain.ms The administration did not like
these results, and ordered the DOI to redo the study. 9 The DOI
redid the study without doing any new field work-they simply
changed the way they put the numbers together-and came up with a
46 percent chance of finding economically recoverable oil.90 The ef-
fect of this type of influence, according to Professor Richard Cellarius,
was to undermine the reputation of federal scientists within the scien-
tific community.91 "If there is a sense that scientific results are sub-
jected to political manipulation before release or that the research
process itself is directed to achieve the politically desired conclusion
from the beginning, then even reasonable and correct results will be
suspect."'
It is not hard to imagine a future administration that would once
again compromise the environment for other issues on its agenda.
The Clinton County court overlooked this possibility and placed too
much trust in the current system. Interpretation of the laws, however,
should not depend on the current administration. As stated during
the debates over reauthorizing Superfund, "[y]ou do not write laws
84. Jon Sure, Politics Muddies Superfivnd; Florio Leading Fight for More Aloney,
Rules, The Record, Sept. 16, 1985, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, NJRec
File. The President was not the only one to blame for the poor performance of the
EPA. Congress played a large part, "grossly" underestimating the quantity of sites
requiring cleanup and the amount of money necessary for that cleanup. United States
v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1417 (6th Cir. 1991). The Sixth Circuit
criticized the EPA "for the slow pace of cleanups, for failing to provide remedies that
would protect public health and the environment, and for alleged 'sweetheart' deals
that reduced cleanup costs for industry at public expense." Id.
85. Michael McCloskey et al., Bush Administration's Handling of Federal Science
Information, Fed. News Serv., Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Fednews File.
86. Id
87. Id-
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id
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based on the personality of current administrators .... You write laws
to get what you want accomplished." 93
II. INTRODUCTION TO CERCLA
Notwithstanding the possible conflicts of interest that may occur,
Congress drafted CERCLA in such a way to give the EPA broad dis-
cretion in remediating hazardous waste sites. This section discusses
the origin and structure of CERCLA.
A. Origin of CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA (commonly called "Superfund") in De-
cember 1980, 91 primarily in response to the Love Canal situation.95
Love Canal was an abandoned canal leading to the Niagara River in
Niagara Falls, New York.96 From 1942 to 1952, the Hooker Chemical
Company disposed of more than 21,000 tons of chemical waste in the
canal.97 When the canal was full in 1953, Hooker covered it with earth
and sold it to the Niagara Falls School Board for one dollar.98 The
school board then built a school and a playground on the site, and the
area bordering the site was developed as a residential community. 99
Local health officials soon found higher-than-normal rates of birth de-
fects, miscarriages, and other problems among Love Canal resi-
dents.100  Eventually, President Carter ordered the federal
government to purchase the 240 homes nearest the site, and the re-
sulting relocation program cost the government more than $30 mil-
lion. 01 In the ensuing several years, Love Canal was labeled a "Public
Health Time Bomb," and people all over the country became aware of
a nationwide hazardous waste problem for the first time."°
Congress drafted CERCLA to provide the EPA with a powerful
means of responding promptly and effectively to cases of environmen-
93. Sure, supra note 84, at Al (quoting Kathy Hurwitt, National Campaign
Against Toxic Hazards).
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
95. Peter K. Johnson, Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Washington: 1997 Superfund
Amendments; Will it Solve the Liability Problem and How Will This Affect Massachu-
setts?, 31 New Eng. L. Rev. 1269, 1272-73 (1997). But see Landy et al., supra note 18,
at 133-40 (suggesting that the timing of Love Canal and the passage of Superfund is
coincidental). Congress enacted CERCLA just over one month after Ronald Reagan
defeated incumbent President Jimmy Carter in the presidential election, during the
"waning hours of the lame duck congressional session." Battle & Lipeles, supra note
10, at 179.
96. Landy et al., supra note 18, at 134. For a thorough discussion of the "tragedy"
at Love Canal, see Wentz, supra note 20, at 306-12.
97. Landy et al., supra note 18, at 134.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Switzer, supra note 35, at 16.
101. Id.
102. Landy et al., supra note 18, at 135-40.
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tal contamination like that at Love Canal. °3 To ensure that the legis-
lation covered all situations ranging from spills and leaking tanks to
midnight dumpers, 1°4 Congress vested the EPA with broad authority:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a sub-
stantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is
a release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any
pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and sub-
stantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is au-
thorized to act... to remove or arrange for the removal of, and
provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant at any time... which the President deems
necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the
environment.10
Attorneys immediately express their fears that the scope of EPA's
power under CERCLA was unlimited:
Generally the bill applies to any "release into the environment" of
any "hazardous substance" from any "facility." All three terms are
defined in such a way as to suggest no discernible limits on their
scope. For example, does the release of hazardous substance from a
facility include the emissions from the painting of a building, the
irrigation of a field... or any of the other myriad human activities
which involve the "release" from a structure, installation, or equip-
ment of a substance which under some circumstances may be re-
garded as harmful to some living organism.106
103. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982) (indicating that CERCLA provided the EPA with "the tools necessary
for a prompt and effective response to problems of national magnitude resulting from
hazardous waste disposal"). Congress designed the Act to eliminate those problems
presented by abandoned hazardous waste dumps that previous laws did not suffi-
ciently address. See id at 1111-12; 1 Allan J. Topol & Rebecca Snow, Superfund Law
and Procedure 2 n.6 (1992). Prior to CERCLA, there were several other ways that
the EPA could try to get authority to respond to situations similar to Love Canal.
Battle & Lipeles, supra note 10, at 180. For example, the Clean Water Act authorized
the Coast Guard to respond to spills of oil and hazardous substances into the naviga-
ble waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994). That provision did not apply to the Love Canal
situation, however, because the contamination involved only soil and groundwater.
Battle & Lipeles, supra note 10, at 180. Section 6973 of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992, authorized the EPA to respond
to solid or hazardous waste emergencies, but it was unclear whether that provision
could be used against parties whose contribution to the emergency occurred wholly in
the past. See i
104. Landy et al., supra note 18, at 144.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1994).
106. Landy et al., supra note 18, at 144 (quoting Letter from Edward
Dunkelberger, Covington and Burling, to Edmund Frost, Vice President and General
Counsel, Chemical Manufacturers Association (July 25, 1980)). In 1992, the Fourth
Circuit showed that Dunkelberger's fears were not unfounded. See Nurad, Inc. v. Vil-
liam E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992). It held a party liable under
CERCLA for "disposal" of hazardous waste when the "disposal" consisted of mate-
rial leaking from a tank. Id. at 845. The court also held that liability under CERCLA
does not require that a party actively participated in hazardous waste management.
Id
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Although CERCLA has not been interpreted broadly enough to
reach, for example, the painting of a building, it does apply in situa-
tions where hazardous substances have leaked from tanks. 7 In such
a situation, the owner of the site at the time the leaking began is a
PRP and therefore liable for cleanup costs.' 8
CERCLA provides for substantial federal funding to allow the fed-
eral government to begin cleanups at the sites of the "most significant
releases of hazardous substances."'0 9 When CERCLA was first en-
acted in 1980, the federal funding was $1.5 billion." 0 That amount
was increased to $8.5 billion when Superfund was reauthorized in
1986.111 Additional money for Superfund is generated from special
taxes placed on the petroleum and chemical industries." 2
B. Structure of CERCLA
CERCLA contains detailed provisions which require specific plan-
ning of hazardous waste response actions." 3 It also includes an elabo-
rate scheme outlining the potential liability of parties related to the
hazardous waste site." 4 This section discusses these two aspects of
CERCLA.
1. Planning Requirements
CERCLA authorizes two types of responses to hazardous waste
contamination: removal actions and remedial actions. A "removal
action" is a short-term response to a release that is intended "to abate,
prevent, minimize, stabilize, mitigate, or eliminate the release or the
threat of release."' " 5 Examples of removal actions include the use of
fences, warning signs, and other forms of site control; the installation
of drainage controls; the removal of leaking drums; and the construc-
tion of caps over contaminated soil to reduce migration of hazardous
substances. 1 6 A "remedial action" is a cleanup activity designed to
achieve a permanent remedy at the site." 7 Remedial actions can in-
clude several of the examples given for removal actions, as well as the
107. See Nurad, 966 F.2d at 845.
108. Id.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1980) (statutory language establishing the Superfund).
The money could also be used to compensate those parties who had already cleaned
up the hazardous waste themselves. Id.
110. See Battle & Lipeles, supra note 10, at 182.
111. Id.
112. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1994).
113. See infra Part II.B.1.
114. See infra Part II.B.2.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1986) (defining terms "remove" and "removal").
116. 40 C.F.R. § 300.415(e) (1997).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1994) (defining terms "remedy" and "remedial action").
A remedial action "prevent[s] or minimize[s] the release of hazardous substances so
that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health
or welfare or the environment." Id.
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collection of leachate"18 and runoff,119 the treatment or incineration of
hazardous substances at the site, and reasonable monitoring to ensure
the adequacy of the remediation effort."2 This Note will discuss only
remedial actions, because removal actions are limited in both time and
scope and thus are not as controversial.' 2'
All CERCLA cleanups are governed by the National Contingency
Plan (NCP),' z ' which specifies the steps to be taken to identify and
investigate CERCLA sites, evaluate possible cleanup strategies, and
decide upon and implement the actual cleanup. 123 The process in-
cludes EPA preparation of a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility
Study (RI/FS) to assess site conditions and evaluate alternative
cleanup actions. 24 The public has a substantial opportunity to partici-
pate in the selection and design of the remediation plan. 25 To that
end, the EPA must publish notices of the proposed and final remedia-
tion plans in the Federal Register and must make those plans available
to the public before it begins pursuing the remedial action. 126 The
EPA must then allow the public a "reasonable opportunity for submis-
sion of written and oral comments."'127 Any notable changes between
the proposed plan and the final plan, along with responses to signifi-
cant public comments on the proposed plan, must be published along
with the final plan."2 The EPA must publish an explanation of any
significant differences between the final published plan and the action
taken, or the terms of any settlement with PRPs regarding cleanup
methods and standards. 29
The focus of the selection and design process for a remediation plan
is to identify a cleanup method that will adequately protect public
health and the environment. 30 The NCP specifies nine factors to con-
sider in the remedy selection.' 3 ' The factors are broken down into
three groups: threshold criteria, balancing criteria, and modifying cri-
118. Leachate is toxic liquid which leaks from areas such as hazardous waste land-
fills and may adversely impact groundwater quality. See Wentz, supra note 20, at 314.
119. Stormwater which has come into contact with hazardous waste is characterized
as runoff, and must be collected and controlled so that it does not adversely affect
adjacent property. Id.
120. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a) (1997).
121. CERCLA imposes absolute limits of $2 million in money expenditures and
twelve months' time to pursue a removal action. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (1994).
122. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (1994).
123. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1997).
124. See i. § 300.430(a)(2) (discussing RI/FS).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1994). In some instances the EPA may choose to have a
public meeting at or near the facility at issue to discuss the proposed plan and cleanup
standards. Id
126. Id.
127. I& § 9617(a)(2).
128. I& § 9617(b).
129. Id. § 9617(c).
130. Id § 9621(d)(1).
131. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f) (1997).
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teria. 132 To be eligible for final selection, a proposed remedy must
first satisfy the two threshold criteria: overall protection of human
health, and compliance with applicable or relevant and appropriate
requirements of federal and state environmental laws (ARARs). 133
The EPA then weighs the five balancing criteria: long-term effective-
ness and permanence; reduction of toxicity, mobility, or volume
through treatment; short-term effectiveness; implementability; and
cost.134 Finally, the EPA considers the two modifying criteria: state
acceptance, and community acceptance. 35
2. Liability of Potentially Responsible Parties
Section 107 of CERCLA imposes liability on specific PRPs for the
release of hazardous waste.' 36 The parties that may be required to
clean up, or pay for the cleanup, of CERCLA sites include: (1) the
current owner and operator of the site; (2) any past owners or opera-
tors where hazardous substances were disposed of on the site during
their ownership or operation; (3) parties that arranged for the disposal
or treatment of hazardous substances at the site; and (4) transporters
who selected the site for the disposal or treatment of the hazardous
substances they transported there. 37 Courts have construed section
107 to impose strict liability, making issues of fault or negligence es-
sentially irrelevant to a finding of liability. 13  CERCLA empowers
the EPA to respond to an actual or threatened release 39 of a hazard-
ous substance either by conducting the cleanup itself and suing the
wide range of responsible parties for reimbursement, 4 ' or by issuing
an administrative order or seeking a court order requiring the respon-
sible parties to conduct the cleanup themselves.141 Once the EPA is-
sues such an order under section 106, and the subject of the order fails
to take the required actions, the EPA may bring an action to enforce
the order.' 42 If the subject of the order fails to perform the ordered
132. Battle & Lipeles, supra note 10, at 366.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).
137. Id. § 9607(a).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding current owner liable for response costs even though it did not contribute to
the contamination); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11
(S.D. Ohio 1983) (establishing joint and several liability when two or more persons
caused a single and indivisible harm).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1994) defines a "release" as any discharge of hazardous
substances into the environment, subject to several exceptions.
140. See id. §§ 9604, 9607.
141. Id. § 9604.
142. See id. § 9606(b)(1).
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actions, the government may recover fines143 and punitive damages of
up to three times the amount of Superfund money expended to per-
form the ordered cleanup. 144 Alternatively, the EPA may itself pro-
ceed with the response action and seek damages for the violation of
the order in its action to recover the response costs.' 45
In addition to the EPA, states,' 46 tribes, 47 and other persons 4 may
undertake removal and remedial actions. 149 If any of these parties in-
cur expenses relating to the response action, they may recover those
costs from the statutorily-defined responsible parties by bringing an
action under section 107(a).' 50 Private parties may bring actions
under section 310 of CERCLA claiming that the Unites States or any
person is violating CERCLA or that an officer of the United States
has failed to perform a non-discretionary duty under CERCLA.' 51
These "citizen suits," as well as all other litigation brought under sec-
tion 9604 or 9606(a), however, must satisfy the critical limit on the
"timing of review."'152
III. SECTION 113(h)
CERCLA specifies the procedure for judicial review of lawsuits
arising under its provisions. 53 With respect to jurisdiction, section
113(b) of the Act provides in pertinent part: "[T]he United States
district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all contro-
versies arising under this chapter, without regard to the citizenship of
the parties or the amount in controversy."'" This grant of jurisdic-
tion, however, is limited by section 113(h).' 55 Any litigation requiring
a federal court "to review any challenges to removal or remedial ac-
tion selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any [section
143. Id. § 9606(b)(1) (authorizing award of fines of up to $25,000 per day against
"[alny person who, without sufficient cause, willfully violates, or fails or refuses to
comply with" a section 106 order).
144. Id § 9607(c)(3) (authorizing recovery of punitive damages from a party liable
for response costs under section 107 who, without sufficient cause, fails or refuses to
comply with a section 106 order).
145. See id. § 9607(c)(3).
146. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.500 (1997).
147. Id § 300.515(b). The NCP prescribes conditions under which Indian tribes are
"afforded substantially the same treatment as states under section 104 of CERCLA."
Id.
148. Id § 300.700(a) ("Any person may undertake a response action to reduce or
eliminate a release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.").
149. See Healy, supra note 8, at 9.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); see Healy, supra note 8, at 9-10 & n. 45 ("40 CF.R.
§ 300.700(c) outlines the § 107 cost-recovery action .... ").
151. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (1994). A non-discretionary duty is "any standard, regula-
tion, condition, requirement, or order [which relates to federal facilities]." Id.
152. Id. § 9613(h).
153. Id. § 9613.
154. Id. § 9613(b).
155. See id. § 9613(h).
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106 administrative] order" is subject to section 113(h), CERCLA's ju-
dicial review preclusion provision. 5 6 This provision imposes crucial
limits on the timing of review, barring federal court jurisdiction to re-
view challenges unless the suit is brought in one of five particular
CERCLA proceedings specified by the statute: 5 7
(1) An action under section 9607 of this title to recover response
costs or damages or for contribution.' 58
(2) An action to enforce an order issued under section 9606(a) of
this title or to recover a penalty for violation of such order.1 59
(3) An action for reimbursement under section 9606(b)(2) of this
title.1 6
0
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens
suits) alleging that the removal or remedial action taken under sec-
tion 9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of this title was
in violation of any requirement of this chapter. Such an action may
not be brought with regard to a removal where a remedial action is
to be undertaken at the site.16'
(5) An action under section 9606 of this title in which the United
States has moved to compel a remedial action.1 62
These provisions allow the EPA to bring an action to recover cleanup
costs expended before the remedial action is completed. 63
The point at which a CERCLA citizen suit may be brought is lim-
ited under section 113(h), which relates to the timing of judicial re-
156. Id. Congress adopted this section, which bans pre-enforcement review, in the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). United States v.
Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 141-42 (3d Cir. 1994), overruled by Clinton
County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Voluntary Purchasing
Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1387-89 (5th Cir. 1989) (indicating that section
113 of SARA was intended to confirm and build upon existing case law by limiting
the timing of judicial review). This provision represents the congressional philosophy
to "clean up first, litigate later." Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 141. Senator Staf-
ford, a proponent of allowing pre-enforcement review, indicated that Congress
wanted to avoid "specious suits [that] would slow cleanup and enable private parties
to avoid or at least delay paying their fair share of cleanup costs." Id. at 141-42 (quot-
ing 132 Cong. Rec. 28,409 (1986)). Prior to the adoption of SARA, courts had al-
ready begun to ban pre-enforcement review. In Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, for
example, the Second Circuit concluded that Congress intended to give the EPA the
power to act quickly in the face of a potential environmental disaster and, thus, did
not allow pre-enforcement review. 800 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Wheaton
Indus. v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1986) (deciding "unequivocally that pre-
enforcement review of EPA's remedial actions ... [is] contrary to the policies under-
lying CERCLA").
157. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1)-(5) (1994). There is an initial exception for diversity of
citizenship cases, id. § 9613(h), but it has not been the subject of significant contro-
versy. Michael P. Healy, The Effectiveness and Fairness of Superfitnd's Judicial Review
Preclusion Provision, 15 Va. Envtl. L.J. 271, 286 n.100 (1995-1996).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1) (1994).
159. Id. § 9613(h)(2).
160. Id. § 9613(h)(3).
161. Id. § 9613(h)(4).
162. Id. § 9613(h)(5).
163. Id. § 9613(h).
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view." The relevant portion of section 9613(h) is the provision
relating to citizen suits (subpart 4), which allows citizen suits "alleging
that the removal or remedial action taken" was in violation of CER-
CLA.165 The courts generally consider two basic factors when reading
section 113(h): plain language and legislative intent.1"6 This section
examines how courts have analyzed the timing of review provision,
and the conflicting interpretations of its statutory language and legis-
lative history.
Judicial interpretation of section 113(h) has gone through three dis-
tinct stages. Prior to the 1994 decision in Princeton Gamma-Tech,
courts strictly enforced the ban on pre-enforcement reviewv. 6" In
Princeton Gamma-Tech, the Third Circuit allowed an exception to
that ban, holding that pre-enforcement review was warranted in situa-
tions where the plaintiffs alleged irreparable harm from the proposed
cleanup."' The Third Circuit reversed that decision, however, in Clin-
ton County, and reverted back to the strict ban on pre-enforcement
review."' 9
A. The State of the Law Before United States v. Princeton
Gamma-Tech
Prior to the Third Circuit's decision in Princeton Gamma-Tech,
courts consistently held that the statutory language of section 113(h)
was clear, and did not allow judicial review of EPA-ordered remedial
actions until the actions were completed.1 7 ° Additionally, the courts
determined that the legislative history of section 113(h) supported
their conclusion that judicial review is precluded until after remedia-
tion is completed. 7 ' As noted in Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc.
164. Id.
165. Id § 9613(h)(4) (emphasis added).
166. Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1022, 1028 (3d Cir. 1997),
cert. denied sub nor. Arrest the Incinerator Remediation, Inc. v. EPA, 118 S. Ct. 687
(1998); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 1990); Alabama v. EPA, 871
F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989).
167. See infra Part III.A.
168. See infra Part III.B.
169. See infra Part III.B-C.
170. See Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control & Ecology,
999 F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (8th Cir. 1993); Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1095; Alabama, 871 F.2d at
1557.
171. Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1095-96; Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1557-58. The House Judici-
ary Committee noted that "[t]his provision is not intended to allow review of the
selection of a response action prior to completion of the action." H.Rt Rep. No. 99-
253, pt. 3, at 23 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3046. Additionally, the
final conference committee report explained that only "completed" remedial actions
could be challenged. H.R. Rep. No. 99-962, at 224 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3317.
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v. Reilly,172 "courts have consistently held that where judicial review
will delay remedial and removal clean up activities, they are barred
from reviewing response actions prior to an attempt by the EPA to
enforce its orders or allegations of liability."' 7 3 There have been ex-
ceptions to this strict ban, however.
B. United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc.
In Princeton Gamma-Tech, the Third Circuit became the first circuit
court of appeals to allow judicial review of proposed remedial actions
before completion of at least a discrete phase of the cleanup. 7 4 This
decision was significant because "it demonstrate[d] the Third Circuit's
willingness to find an exception to the jurisdictional bar under the citi-
zens' suit subsection of 9613(h)(4), despite obvious procedural obsta-
cles and conflicting legislative history.""'
Princeton Gamma-Tech owned property which the EPA placed on
the NPL 1 7 6 after discovering trichloroethylene (TCE) contamination
in the groundwater.'77 The EPA's remedial plan for the facility was
extraction of the contaminated water from the plume in the shallower
of two aquifers, treating it, and re-injecting it into that aquifer.'7 8 The
plan also called for several "open-hole" wells which penetrated
through the shallow aquifer to the deep aquifer.'7 9 The wells were to
allow for monitoring and sampling of the deep aquifer. 8 The site
owners challenged the remedy under the CERCLA citizen suit provi-
172. 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989). For a more comprehensive discussion of how
the legislative history can be construed to support this position, see the discussion of
Clinton County Comm'rs at infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
173. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 889 F.2d at 1387.
174. Silecchia, supra note 13, at 345. In Ehrlich v. Rent, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 21586
(3d Cir. 1995), the Third Circuit indicated there were two exceptions to the require-
ment that a cleanup must be completed before it may be challenged. Id. The first
exception is from Princeton Gamma-Tech, holding that section 113 does not bar juris-
diction over an injunctive action alleging irreparable harm inconsistent with CER-
CLA. The second exception is from Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v.
Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828, 837 (D.NJ. 1989), holding that judicial review of cleanup
action is available after the first phase of that remedy is complete.
175. Paul H. McConnell, Note, CERCLA WRESTLING-Grappling with Conflict-
ing Legislative Intent and the Citizens' Suit Provision-United States v. Princeton
Gamma-Tech, 14 Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 115, 116-17 (1995).
176. The NPL is a list of locations in the United States that are in need of cleanup.
42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1994). Sites are judged for the NPL based on a Hazard
Ranking System (HRS) provided in CERCLA. See id. § 9605(c)(1) ("[T]he hazard
ranking system accurately assesses the relative degree of risk to human health and the
environment posed by sites and facilities subject to review."). The practical ramifica-
tion of listing a site on the NPL is that the EPA may use Superfund money to perform
both removal and remedial actions at the site. See id. § 9604(a).
177. United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1994),
overruled by Clinton County Comm'rs, 116 F.3d at 1018.
178. Id. at 141.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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sion, because they alleged the proposed system would possibly cause
contaminated water from the shallow aquifer to be drawn down into
the deep aquifer.18' The EPA had not conclusively established that
there was contamination in the deep aquifer, so the remedial plan
could have potentially increased, rather than remedied, the pollution
of the water supply.'
The court first examined the citizen suit provision, and its restric-
tion under section 113(h), CERCLA's timing of review provision."s
The court then determined that the statutory language of section
113(h)(4) is unclear, and that use of the past tense "action taken,"
does not indicate that the entire remedial action must be completed
before allowing judicial review.1s In large part, however, the court
glossed over the language of the statute, basing most of its opinion on
the statute's legislative history.s It was motivated by concern over
other courts' evisceration"s of the statutes' citizen suit provision.1"
As the court noted, "statutory interpretation that calls for the full
completion of the plan before review is permitted makes the citizens'
suit provision an absurdity."'" s This absurdity is directly seen in cases
where irreparable harm to the public health is alleged, and the statute
does not allow meaningful judicial review. The court reasoned that it
was not bound by prior decisions because in interpreting section
113(h)(4), those decisions did not deal directly with alleged irrepara-
ble harm to public health and the environment resulting from the
cleanup measures themselves. 8 9
181. Id. The challenge was made as a counterclaim in a suit by the EPA for reim-
bursement of response costs already incurred at the site. Gamma-Tech, the site
owner, is also the responsible party. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 144.
184. Id. at 145; see Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F. Supp.
828, 833 (D.NJ. 1989) ("[T]he statute's language fails to answer the question of how
much must be done before review is available.").
185. The court actually dismissed the importance of the plain language of the stat-
ute in two sentences. Princeton Ganuna Ted, 31 F.3d at 145. The court noted:
From these conflicting views of the members of Congress who directly par-
ticipated in the drafting of the statute, one might be tempted to resort to the
wag's statement that, when the legislative history is unclear, one should refer
to the language of the statute. However, in this instance it must be conceded
that the term "action taken" in subsection 9613(h)(4) does not speak in clear
terms either.
Id. (citation omitted).
186. See supra Part III.A.
187. Princeton Gamma-Ted:, 31 F.3d at 146 ("The citizens' suit provision is effec-
tively nullified if litigation must be delayed until after irreparable harm or damage is
done.").
188. Id.; see also North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1991)
(remarking that, in some cases, section 113(h) would do more than affect the "timing"
of judicial review; it would extinguish it).
189. Specifically, the court discussed the holdings in Arkansas Peace Cr. v. Arkan-
sas Dep't of Pollution Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1216-19 (8th Cir. 1993),
Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7th Cir. 1990). and Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d
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The Princeton Gamma-Tech court indicated that, because the plain
language and legislative history of these provisions were unclear, it
could examine the overall goals of CERCLA to interpret the stat-
ute. 90 The court found that the primary goal of CERCLA was to
eliminate the danger of harm from sites contaminated with toxic waste
and hazardous substances. 191 Congress intended for this to be done as
quickly and with as little expense as possible, and with as much as
possible of that expense borne by the responsible parties (PRPs)
rather than by the taxpayers. 192 The court indicated that, "[i]n circum-
stances where irreparable environmental damage will result from a
planned response action, forcing parties to wait until the project has
been fully completed before hearing objections to the action would
violate the purposes of CERCLA."'193
The court also relied on dicta from a district court case in the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania.'94 The district court in Cabot Corp. v.
EPA'95 recognized a difference between compensable and irreparable
injury in citizen suit cases, and concluded that "[h]ealth and environ-
mental hazards must be addressed as promptly as possible rather than
awaiting the completion of an inadequately protective response ac-
tion."'196 Compensable injuries, on the other hand, should be dealt
with after the remediation was completed.' 97 Finding this logic com-
pelling, the Princeton Gamma-Tech court held that the district court
did have jurisdiction to review bona fide contentions of irreparable
harm and, where appropriate, to grant injunctions. 98
1548, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989). Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 144, 148. In those
cases, the citizen plaintiffs alleged that the proposed cleanup violated CERCLA regu-
lations. The court also acknowledged Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d
Cir. 1991), in which the plaintiffs alleged that the action planned would irreparably
harm historical artifacts. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 147. Challenges to these
actions were not allowed to be heard prior to the completion of the clean-up. No
citizen, however, alleged that irreparable environmental harm would occur as a result
of the clean-up. This distinction was central to the Princeton Gamma-Tech holding.
190. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 144-46.
191. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3038, 3038 ("CERCLA has two goals: (1) to provide for clean-up if a hazardous sub-
stance is released into the environment or if such release is threatened, and (2) to
hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these clean-ups."); 132 Cong. Rec.
29753 (1986) (statement of Sen. Scheuer) ("[The people] want the overriding purpose
of this bill which is to protect the lives, the health, and the safety and the well-being of
the American public from these nauseating toxic wastes that litter our country by the
thousands.").
192. Silecchia, supra note 13, at 339-40; McConnell, supra note 175, at 122 n.76; see
supra note 191.
193. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 144-45.
194. Id. at 146 (citing Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988)).
195. 677 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
196. Id. at 829.
197. Id.
198. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 149.
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The Princeton Gamma-Tech court, as noted, determined that the
legislative history of section 113(h) is unclear.'9 In particular, the
court noted that the conflicting statements in the legislative history
came from the drafters of the statute."' Other courts have tried to
explain this conflict in the legislative history. For example, in United
States v. Colorado,2°" the Tenth Circuit noted that Congress consid-
ered a differentiation between suits by PRPs who sought to delay a
CERCLA response, and "legitimate" citizen suits that sought to fur-
ther the protection of public health and the environment.20 2 Under
this line of reasoning, the legislative history which seemingly creates
an absolute ban on pre-enforcement review203 speaks only to suits
brought by PRPs. The legislative history which would allow review in
limited circumstances,' in contrast, speaks to bona fide citizen suits
of the sort involved in Princeton Gamma-Tech and Clinton County, as
will be seen below.
Several scholars also contend that the legislative history is unclear.
For example, one article notes that there are many references in the
legislative history supporting the more liberal review policy that the
199. Id. at 145; see also Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1024 n.2
(3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nOra Arrest the Incinerator Remediation, Inc. v. EPA.
118 S. Ct. 687 (1998) ("In Princeton Gamma-Tedi, we noted the existence of some
support in the legislative history for the plaintiffs' interpretation of section 9613(h)(4),
that judicial review of incomplete EPA remedial actions is permitted whenever a chal-
lenge includes bona fide allegations of irreparable harm to public health or the
environment.").
200. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 145 (citing conflicting statements of Rep.
Glickman, Sen. Thurmond, Rep. Roe, and Rep. Florio, among others). Senator Thur-
mond discussed the proper timing of a citizens suit
"Taken or secured," [in section 9613(h)(4)] means that all of the activities set
forth in the record of decision which includes the challenged action have
been completed .... The section is designed to preclude lawsuits by any
person concerning particular segments of the response action... until those
segments of the response have been constructed and given the chance to
operate and demonstrate their effectiveness in meeting the requirements of
the act. Completion of all of the work set out in a particular record of deci-
sion marks the first opportunity at which review of that portion of the re-
sponse action can occur (quoting Sen. Thurmond).
132 Cong. Rec. 28,441 (1986). This statement may be contrasted with that made by
Senator Stafford, the Chairman of the Committee on Environment and Public Works,
which was the Senate committee primarily responsible for the bill:
It is crucial, if it is at all possible, to maintain citizens' rights to challenge
response actions, or final cleanup plans, before such plans are implemented
even in part because otherwise the response could proceed in violation of
the law and waste millions of dollars of Superfund money before a court has
considered the illegality.... [C]itizens asserting a true public health or envi-
ronmental interest in the response cannot obtain adequate relief if an inade-
quate cleanup is allowed to proceed...
Id. at 28,409 (quoting Sen. Stafford).
201. 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993).
202. Id. at 1577-78.
203. See 132 Cong. Rec., 28,441 (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
204. See id. at 28,409 (statement of Sen. Stafford).
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Princeton Gamma-Tech court adopted. °5 One such statement was
made by Representative Florio: "In order to be fully effective in en-
forcing the law's cleanup standards provisions, such suits must be
brought at a point in the cleanup process where the agency could eas-
ily be ordered to modify its violative behavior. 20 6 These statements
supporting the decision in Princeton Gamma-Tech, contrasted with the
statements supporting the opposite conclusion, indicate that the legis-
lative history is indeed unclear.
C. Clinton County Commissioners v. EPA and Supporting Cases
The Third Circuit became the first circuit court to allow pre-en-
forcement review of EPA-selected remedial activities before their
completion in Princeton Gamma-Tech.217 Three years later, however,
the court overturned Princeton Gamma-Tech in Clinton County
Commissioners.
The Drake Chemical manufacturing site in Pennsylvania operated
from the 1940s to 1982, and contained contaminated soil, sludges,
tanks, and wastewater lagoons.20 8 The EPA considered this contami-
nation hazardous to human health and the environment, and took
over the site in 1982.209 The EPA decided, in 1988, after notice and
opportunity for public comment, to remedy the site by excavating the
contaminated soil.210 The soil would be incinerated on-site and then
returned to the site as "clean" soil.2 1' Five years later, the EPA
awarded the contract for the incineration.1 2 The first step in the
remediation process was to conduct a "trial burn" in which some of
the soil is burned to gather data for evaluating the remedial
method. 3 This process was intended to (1) verify that the incinerator
205. Silecchia, supra note 13, at 371 n.155 ("As with so many uses of legislative
history, there are statements in the legislative records that support opposing positions.
While the court rightly points to those statements supporting the bar, there are also
plentiful references supporting the more liberal review policy the court ultimately
adopts.").
206. 132 Cong. Rec. 29,741 (1986) (statement of Rep. Florio); see also Nathan H.
Steams, Comment, Cleaning up the Mess, or Messing up the Cleanup: Does CER.
CLA's Jurisdictional Bar (Section 113(h)) Prohibit Citizen Suits Brought Under
RCRA, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 49, 60-61 (1994) (indicating that the legislative
history of 113(h) shows that several members of Congress encouraged courts to make
a distinction between suits brought by PRPs and legitimate citizen suits, which allege
that public health or the environment would be threatened if the proposed action
were undertaken).
207. United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994), overruled
by Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997).
208. Clinton County Comm'rs 116 F.3d at 1020, cert. denied sub nom. Arrest the
Incinerator, Inc. v. EPA, 118 S. Ct. 687 (1998).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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will meet performance standards; (2) determine appropriate operating
requirements; and (3) evaluate the potential risks from operation of
the incinerator to determine whether the remedy should proceed.2 14
The Clinton County Commissioners and Arrest the Incinerator
Remediation (AIR) challenged the trial burn under the citizen suit
provision of CERCLA,15 seeking to enjoin the trial burn. 1 6 They
alleged that the trial burn would result in emission of dangerous
amounts of highly toxic dioxins that would contaminate the local air,
soil, and food chain, and create an unacceptable risk of cancer and
other serious illnesses.1 17 In essence, the plaintiffs were alleging irrep-
arable harm to the public health and the environment if the trial burn
were to go forward. The district court dismissed the complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that CERCLA's timing of
review provision precluded the court from exercising jurisdiction over
a citizen suit challenging the EPA remedial action prior to the comple-
tion of the action. 1 ' The plaintiffs subsequently appealed the
decision. 19
The Clinton County case came to the full circuit from a recommen-
dation by a three-judge panel, who refused to dismiss the suit3z °
While the panel considered itself bound by the Princeton Gamma-
Tech decision, it was apparently uncomfortable with that opinion and
recommended that the case be heard en banc to resolve the issue. 2 1
The source of the uncertainty was that every other circuit court of
appeals had refused to construe section 113(h)'s timing of review pro-
vision as allowing any pre-enforcement review whatsoever, regardless
of who brought the suit or what kind of harm plaintiffs alleged.222
Unlike the Princeton Gamma-Tech court, the Clinton County court
determined that the statutory language of section 113(h)(4) is clear,
and does not allow judicial review of incomplete EPA-ordered reme-
dial actions.3 The court interpreted this provision as requiring that
challenges to removal and remedial actions be brought only after the
remedial action has been completed.224 The court reached this con-
clusion by relying on other courts' preclusion of such suits under sec-
tion 113(h), even where impending irreparable harm is alleged.'
214. Id at 1020-21.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994).
216. Clinton County Comm'rs, 116 F.3d at 1021.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id
220. Id. at 1020.
221. Id.
222. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; supra Part III.A.
223. Clinton County Conun'rs, 116 F.3d at 1022-25.
224. Id. at 1022-23.
225. See, e.g., Hanford Downwinders Coalition v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that CERCLA's timing of review provision did not deprive citizen
groups of due process); Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control
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These other courts based their decisions on the plain language of the
statute.2 26 They found that the title of the section, "Timing of Re-
view, ' '227 and its use of the past tense, "removal or remedial action
taken, "228 indicated that Congress intended to authorize federal court
challenges to remedial action under CERCLA only after the remedial
action has been completed.22 9 As the Seventh Circuit noted in Schalk,
"[tihe statute precludes federal court review at this stage-when a re-
medial plan has been chosen, but not 'taken' or 'secured."' 3 In addi-
tion, these courts claim that legislative history supports their
construction of the statute.231
Similarly, the Clinton County court determined that the legislative
history of section 113(h) supports the conclusion that judicial review is
precluded until after remediation is completed.23 2 The court pointed
to a report of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, which
stated that section 113(h) codified the principle that "there is no right
of judicial review of the Administrator's selection and implementation
of response actions until after the response action have [sic] been
completed to their completion."'1 3 The Clinton County court also ex-
plained that the Judiciary Committee had proposed an amendment
that would have allowed citizens to "seek review of remedial actions
(not removal actions) during construction and implementation of such
actions when a specific remedial measure that has been constructed is
& Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that CERCLA only permitted chal-
lenges to removal and remedial actions that had already occurred before suit was
filed); Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990) (indicating that a federal court
does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider challenges to remedial actions
that have not been taken); Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1989) (ruling
that no action may be brought to compel compliance with provisions of CERCLA
until the remedial action is actually taken). But see North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930
F.2d 1239, 1245-46 (7th Cir. 1991) (weighing the likelihood of irreparable harm in
determining whether the court had jurisdiction to grant an injunction under 113(h)).
226. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1994).
228. Id. § 9613(h)(4) (emphasis added).
229. Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1095; Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1557.
230. Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1095.
231. Id. at 1096; Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1557. The final conference committee report
that reconciled conflicting House and Senate versions explained that only "com-
pleted" remedial actions could be challenged. H.R. Rep. No. 99-962, at 224 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3317. The House Judiciary Committee noted
that "[t]his provision is not intended to allow review of the selection of a response
action prior to completion of the action. . . ." H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, at 23 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3046. These courts fail to account for considera-
ble legislative history supporting review of response actions when irreparable harm is
alleged. See supra Part III.B.
232. Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1023 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Arrest the Incinerator Remediation, Inc. v. EPA, 118 S. Ct. 687 (1998).
233. H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 81 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
2863.
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allegedly in violation of a requirement of this Act."' Because Con-
gress did not enact the Judiciary Committee's proposed amendment,
the court reasoned that Congress was committed to preventing all ju-
dicial interference with remedial actions"3
The Clinton County court's reliance on the decisions of other cir-
cuits, however, is problematic. While none of the other circuit courts
interpreted the citizen suit provision as expansively as the Third Cir-
cuit in Princeton Gamma-Tech, none were faced with an allegation of
irreparable harm to public health3 6 Had it been faced with irrepara-
ble harm to the public health or the environment, the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was willing to interpret sec-
tion 113(h) as expansively as had the Princeton Gamma-Tech court. 37
The claim before the court, however, was an allegation of monetary
harm brought before any remedial action was completed, which was
specifically precluded by section 113(h)(1). 238 Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit was willing to weigh the likelihood that the claimant would
suffer irreparable harm in North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA.239 In that
case, however, the likelihood of irreparable harm was so small that the
court could not justify granting an injunction and, instead, dismissed
the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 40
234. H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 22 (1985). reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038,
3046.
235. Clinton County Comm'rs, 116 F.3d at 1024 n.1.
236. United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138, 144-45 (3d Cir. 1994),
overruled by Clinton County Comm'rs, 116 F.3d at 1018; Silecchia, supra note 13, at
375-76; see also Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control & Ecol-
ogy, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993) (involving a citizen suit that alleged incineration
remedy failed to meet EPA regulations); Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011
(3d Cir. 1991) (involving a citizen suit that alleged EPA would violate the National
Historic Preservation Act if it implemented its cleanup plan); Schalk v. Reilly, 900
F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990) (involving a citizen suit that alleged EPA had violated the
National Contingency Plan by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement);
Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1989) (involving a citizen suit that
alleged EPA failed to comply with CERCLA's notice and comment provision). But
see McConnell, supra note 175, at 128 (noting that, while the majority in Princeton
Gamma-Tech indicated that this was a case of first impression, their decision regard-
ing the timing of review appears to be in conflict with at least three other circuit court
cases).
237. Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823, 827-30 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (indicating that,
in bona fide citizen suits (not brought by PRPs) where irreparable harm is alleged,
section 113(h) would not bar pre-enforcement review).
238. Id. at 829.
239. 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging that, although petitioner
may suffer irreparable harm from the EPA's actions, the likelihood was small).
240. Id. Another caveat from the North Shore Gas case is that the plaintiffs were
potentially responsible parties and one of their claims dealt with issues of liability
allocation. Id.
1998] 1965
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
IV. PROPOSING A SOLUTION ALLOWING LIMITED JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Immediately following the Princeton Gamma-Tech decision, several
scholars critiqued the merits of allowing an exception to the section
113(h) ban on pre-enforcement review.2 4 ' Part IV.A discusses policy
reasons for lifting the ban on pre-enforcement review. This part then
analyzes a noteworthy proposal excepting some situations from sec-
tion 113(h)'s ban on pre-enforcement review, and suggests an alter-
nate approach which combines the merits of that solution and several
additional requirements.
A. Policy Reasons for Lifting the Ban
One theme running through the appellate courts' applications of
section 113(h)(4) is a reluctance to strictly apply the pre-enforcement
ban. 24 2 Courts express dissatisfaction with a strict pre-enforcement
ban because review of bona fide allegations of irreparable harm is
sound policy.243 Delay in preventing such injuries is contrary to the
objectives of CERCLA and results in the nullification of the right to
the remedy envisioned by the citizen suit provision.244 While the
courts' holdings in these situations have been strict, the opinions often
express regret that the claims will go unheard until after the remedial
action is completed.245 For example, in Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup
Emergency v. Reilly,2 46 the court acknowledged that lifting the bar on
241. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 157, at 355 (recommending congressional amend-
ment of CERCLA to permit pre-completion review of a claim alleging irreparable
harm at the administrative level, before the EPA Environmental Appeals Board);
McConnell, supra note 175, at 134 (submitting that Congress did not intend for dis-
trict courts to have jurisdiction over CERCLA pre-enforcement claims of irreparable
harm); Silecchia, supra note 13, at 395 (suggesting that Congress should modify CER-
CLA to create a narrow exception to the ban on pre-enforcement review in 113(h),
and model that exception on Princeton Gamma-Tech); Steams, supra note 206, at 52
(proposing that citizens suits challenging CERCLA cleanups should be brought under
RCRA, "[b]ecause RCRA compels handlers of hazardous wastes to manage their
wastes in a way that eliminates risk of future harm to public health and the
environment").
242. See, e.g., North Shore Gas Co., 930 F.2d at 1245 (7th Cir. 1991) (reflecting that
"the breadth of section 113(h) is troublesome"); Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923
F.2d 1011, 1023-24 (3d Cir. 1991) (expressing sympathy for the irreparable harm that
might arise without judicial review); Hanford Downwinders Coalition v. Dowdle, 841
F. Supp. 1050, 1063 (E.D. Wash. 1993) ("Harsh as this result [denying subject matter
jurisdiction] may be, it is compelled by the severely restrictive language Congress has
chosen to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts."); Silecchia, supra note 13, at 367
(noting the trend in judicially-expressed dissatisfaction in upholding the section
113(h) ban where irreparable harm could result).
243. McConnell, supra note 175, at 128.
244. United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138, 148 (3d Cir. 1994), over-
ruled by Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997). See generally
McConnell, supra note 175 (discussing the nullification of the citizen suit provision).
245. See supra note 242.
246. 716 F. Supp. 828 (D.N.J. 1989).
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pre-enforcement review for health reasons makes sense as a matter of
policy.247 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in North Shore Gas Co. v.
EPA,' remarked that "the breadth of section 113(h) is trouble-
some." 249 That court stated, in dicta, "[i]n such a case [where irrepa-
rable harm is alleged,] section 113(h) would be doing a good deal
more than affecting the 'timing' of judicial review; it would be extin-
guishing judicial review."''z 0
The facts and circumstances of the circuit court cases in line with
Clinton County illustrate the inequities which may result from a total
ban on pre-enforcement review. For example, in 1991, the Third Cir-
cuit upheld the ban in Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson."5 There, the EPA
had developed a cleanup plan for property on which the plaintiffs al-
leged American Indian remains and artifacts were found.25' The
plaintiffs asserted that, before conducting its proposed cleanup, the
EPA was required to review the remedial plan under the applicable
provisions of the National Historic Preservation Act. 5 The plaintiffs
alleged that irreparable harm could potentially occur to the irreplace-
able cultural artifacts if the EPA was allowed to conduct the cleanup
without such a review.1 4 While the court was sympathetic to the ir-
reparable harm that might arise if it refused to hear the plaintiff's
case, it concluded that judicial review was unavailable before the
cleanup was completed." 5
In Schalk v. Reilly,-56 the plaintiffs argued that the EPA should be
enjoined from undertaking the proposed remedial method because
247. Id. at 833. The court was strict in upholding the ban, however, looking both to
the plain language and the legislative history of section 113(h). Id. ("Congress's use of
the past tense... combined with its final sentence ... point(s] to one conclusion:
Congress intended judicial review of EPA remedial action only after some action is
undertaken.").
248. 930 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1991).
249. Id. at 1245.
250. Id.
251. 923 F.2d 1011, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991).
252. Id. at 1013.
253. Id. The National Historic Preservation Act provides that those responsible for
federally-assisted undertakings like a CERCLA cleanup must:
[P]rior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the under-
taking or prior to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take into
account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure,
or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register.
16 U.S.C.A. § 470(f) (1998) (cited in Boarzead, 923 F.2d at 1013 n.2).
254. Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1014.
255. Id. at 1023. The court stated that:
Although post-study judicial review cannot rectify damage to historical arti-
facts or remains on this landmark site that occurs in the course of the EPA's
clean-up, we must presume Congress balanced the problem of irreparable
harm to such interests and concluded that the interest in removing the haz-
ard of toxic waste from Superfund sites outweighed it. Boarhead's remedy
lies with Congress, not the district court.
Id
256. 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990).
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they failed to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and
conduct a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS). 5 7 The
EPA is required to prepare an EIS and conduct a RI/FS for all of their
cleanup plans.2  Preparing an EIS involves undertaking a compre-
hensive analysis of the effects which a proposed action will have on
the environment before the action is taken. 9 A remedial investiga-
tion involves fairly extensive sampling and data collection, treatability
studies, and a baseline risk assessment.26 ° The feasibility study entails
identifying and screening remedial alternatives.2 61 Because the EPA
failed to perform these investigations and studies, the plaintiffs argued
that the EPA's proposed remedy of incineration for PCB-contami-
nated soil was arbitrary. 62 The court nevertheless concluded that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the complaint, interpreting
section 113(h) to preclude pre-enforcement review of EPA-selected
remedies. 63 The EPA was thus permitted to implement the remedial
method without the proper internal review required by law.26
The Eighth Circuit was faced with a challenge to the EPA's ap-
proval of using a specific incinerator for disposal of dioxin-contami-
nated soil in Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Department of
Pollution Control and Ecology.265 The incinerator failed to demon-
strate the destruction removal efficiency of 99.9999% required by stat-
ute for all incinerators used to burn hazardous waste ("six nines"
requirement). 66 The district court had previously concluded that the
burning of dioxin-containing wastes in this incinerator violated EPA
regulations, and that the potential irreparable harm to the plaintiffs
was significant enough to award a preliminary injunction.2 67 The
court of appeals reversed, again claiming lack of subject matter juris-
diction as per section 113(h).268 Closing off the channels of judicial
review in this situation may have caused pollution of the surrounding
257. See id. at 1094.
258. An EIS is required pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), which was passed to "promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate dam-
age to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man."
42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1969). A Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study is re-
quired pursuant to CERCLA. 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(f)-(h) (1997); see supra note 124 and
accompanying text.
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1969).
260. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1997).
261. Id.
262. See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the plain-
tiffs claimed no other remedies were considered by the EPA).
263. Id. at 1097-98.
264. See id. at 1098; supra note 258.
265. 999 F.2d 1212, 1215 (8th Cir. 1993).
266. Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 264.343(a)(2) (1997).
267. Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control & Ecology, No.
LR-C-92-684, Order at 12-13 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 17, 1993).
268. Arkansas Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1218-19.
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community, pollution which could have been avoided had the Eighth
Circuit reviewed the claim.
The arguments for judicial review are stronger when the courts dis-
tinguish challenges based on monetary harm from health-related chal-
lenges. Allowing only health-related irreparable harm challenges
would prevent many PRPs from attempting to delay liability by bring-
ing suit.2 69 In Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 70 the court stated that where
PRPs allege harms which solely implicate monetary relief, those alle-
gations should be heard only when the EPA seeks to collect cleanup
costs.271 In contrast, health hazards must be addressed as promptly as
possible, rather than awaiting the completion of an inadequately pro-
tective or harmful response action.2' Thus, Congress's decision to en-
able the EPA to clean up hazardous waste sites prior to litigating the
allocation of the expenses of the cleanups supports a distinction be-
tween citizen suits alleging irreparable health harms and those claim-
ing monetary damages. 7 3
Other provisions of CERCLA and its overall goal support the inter-
pretation allowing pre-enforcement judicial review in limited situa-
tions. 274 Congress's intent to allow citizen groups' involvement in
cleanup actions is evident in section 117 of CERCLA.7 5 This section
gives the public an opportunity to participate in the selection and de-
sign of the remedial plan mandated by the EPA.276 Such participation
increases the chances that communities will support the plan eventu-
ally chosen.277 When the EPA selects a plan that the community
thinks is improper, allowing judicial review of that plan is in line with
congressional intent.27" In addition, delay in preventing harm to pub-
269. See McConnell, supra note 175, at 128.
270. 677 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
271. Id. at 829.
272. Id
273. Id.; see Healy, supra note 8, at 3-4 (indicating that, while immediate judicial
review is plainly foreclosed when it will stop or slow a site's cleanup, a more difficult
case occurs where early review "(1) presents no apparent threat to the policies of
CERCLA; [or] (2) may affirmatively serve another important policy of CERCLA,
such as ensuring the safety of individuals residing nearby the site").
274. McConnell, supra note 175, at 128-29.
275. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1986).
276. Id.; see supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
277. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 90 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2853, 2872 ("The Committee is of the strong opinion that communities affected by
Superfund sites will demonstrate much stronger support for actions necessary to clean
up those sites if the community is involved ... to complete the cleanup."); see also
Healy, supra note 8, at 48 ("When a claimant has participated in the section 117 pro-
cess of identifying a cleanup plan and has raised health-based concerns about the
effects of the cleanup procedures in that context, a court should have jurisdiction over
a citizens suit raising the health-based claims that were unsuccessful in the proceed-
ing." (footnotes omitted)).
278. See Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823, 828-29 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (explaining
that barring judicial review until after the EPA has implemented the action eviscer-
ates the citizen suit provision's purpose).
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lic health is contrary to the overall congressional intent of CER-
CLA.27 9 Thus, allowing irreparable harm to occur does not further
CERCLA's goals.2"' The Princeton Gamma-Tech court noted that,
where a court finds defects which would cause irreparable harm to
public health in the EPA's planned remedial action, those defects
should be corrected before further unwarranted drains on limited
Superfund resources occur.28 ' This construction of the judicial review
provision most completely furthers CERCLA's purpose. This ap-
proach also receives some support from a House Report:
The purpose of [the review preclusion] provision is to ensure that
there will be no delays associated with a legal challenge of the par-
ticular removal or remedial action selected under section 104 or se-
cured through administrative order or judicial action under section
106. Without such a provision, responses to releases or threatened
releases of hazardous substances could be unduly delayed, thereby
exacerbating the threat of damage to human health or the
environment. 8 2
This language ties Congress's concerns about litigation delays28 3 to its
concern that public health will be threatened.2 4
A final policy reason for allowing limited review of pre-enforce-
ment challenges is that Congress has not defined another mechanism
to ensure a fair process for considering claims about the effects of im-
plementing a remedial action.8 5 Without the Princeton Gamma-Tech
exception, this leads to an absence of meaningful review. Examining
this lack of review in light of the congressional goal of community-
wide involvement leads to the conclusion that local support for the
cleanup will be lost. 6 The public will question whether the EPA is
seriously concerned about important public health issues.2 s7
279. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
280. United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1994), over-
ruled by Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997).
281. Id.
282. H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 5, at 25 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124,
3148.
283. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 191.
285. McConnell, supra note 175, at 129; see also Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp.
823, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("Irreparable harms are precisely those that one would ex-
pect 'typical' concerned citizens-neighboring residents of hazardous waste sites-to
raise in a lawsuit under CERCLA.").
286. If the community's objections to the plan are not heard, their involvement is
effectively ended at a time when they think their involvement is necessary, and they
will cease to support the plan. See H.R. Rep. No. 253, pt. 5, at 65 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3188 ("The Committee Believes that increased public partic-
ipation will in the short term add procedural steps to the decision-making process, but
in the long term will expedite cleanup progress and increase public understanding of
and support for remedial actions undertaken at Superfund sites."); Healy, supra note
8, at 48.
287. See H.R. Rep. No. 253, pt. 5, at 65 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124,
3188 ("[P]ublic confidence in the Superfund program is vital to the program's success.
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B. Critique of One Proposal to Allow Section 113(h) Pre-
Enforcement Review in Cases of Irreparable Harm
Professor Lucia Ann Silecchia2ss suggests that the Princeton
Gamma-Tech decision should be used as the model for legislative re-
form of section 113(h). 89 Silecchia advocates congressional reconsid-
eration of the pre-enforcement review ban, and ultimately
recommends an exception to section 113(h) which would allow "a re-
medial order to be challenged through a citizens suit under a set of
guidelines that will allow courts to block an unhealthy or environmen-
tally harmful remedial plan from progressing."2' She also calls for
congressional refining of CERCLA's public comment provisions, so
that the EPA will more extensively receive notice of community and
PRP concerns regarding proposed cleanup plans.291 Additional con-
sideration in the public comment stage will limit the potential irreme-
diable harm claims requiring judicial review.29
Silecchia submits that, upon a showing of irreparable harm by the
plaintiffs, the court should grant an injunction prohibiting the cleanup
and order the EPA to reformulate the cleanup plan.293 Her proposed
plan requires (1) strict requirements as to the nature of the harm that
must be alleged; 94 (2) limitations on joinder of non-ecological claims
to the cleanup challenge;295 and (3) allocation of costs to the losing
party.2 9 6 This approach, however, is ultimately inadequate in several
respects. It calls for a congressional response, while a judicial re-
sponse appears preferable. Moreover, it is too broad, asking judges to
make highly technical decisions which are better left to the EPA. The
proposal also does not consider the possibility that the EPA-selected
Without a high level of public confidence, no matter how well designed the program is
in theory and no matter how technically perfect the basic statute and implementing
regulations are, the Superfund program will not achieve its goals."); Healy, supra note
8, at 48.
288. Silecchia is an Assistant Professor at the Catholic University of America, Co-
lumbus School of Law. Silecchia, supra note 13, at 339 n.*.
289. Id. at 379.
290. Id at 382.
291. Id. at 382-83. She recommends that members of the affected community be
given broad opportunity to contribute evidence of medical and ecological concerns.
ld. at 383.
292. Id
293. Id. at 385, 388.
294. Id. at 385. This requirement narrows the type of claims a court may hear,
establishing a specific set of circumstances in which plaintiffs may use the exception.
Id. at 386.
295. Id at 385. This requirement reduces the incentives of PRPs to use the provi-
sion to "piggyback" financial-based claims to delay implementation of the plan. Id. at
387.
296. Id. at 385. This requirement should dissuade plaintiffs from making non-bona
fide claims of irreparable harm. See id Additionally, Silecchia notes that it may pro-
vide an incentive for the EPA to consider the health aspects of its proposed remedies
to avoid litigation, because the consequence of not fully considering the health aspects
is an increase in litigation. Id. at 387.
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cleanup plan, while harmful, may be the only viable alternative to an
even more harmful health hazard. This part addresses the inadequa-
cies in Silecchia's response.
1. Judicial Review is More Appropriate
Silecchia's proposal recommends a congressional response to the
lack of pre-enforcement review for claims of irreparable harm. 97
Congress has made a number of proposals to reauthorize 9 ' CERCLA
subsequent to the Princeton Gamma-Tech decision. 99 These propos-
als focus on several more controversial and well-publicized issues,
such as retroactive liability,300 the joint and several liability scheme,"'
and administrative reforms to reduce Superfund transaction and liti-
gation costs.3 0 2 The irreparable harm situation was probably not con-
sidered in current proposals for revising section 113(h). 3
297. Id. at 382.
298. Reauthorization of CERCLA was necessary because the funding authoriza-
tion for the Superfund expired at the end of fiscal year 1994. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a),
(p)(1)(H) (1994).
299. The Reform of Superfund Act of 1995 was originally introduced in the House
on October 18, 1995. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). It was sponsored by
Representative Michael G. Oxley, a Republican from Ohio. Id. The Accelerated
Cleanup and Environmental Restoration Act of 1996 was introduced in the Senate on
September 29, 1995. S. 1285, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). It was sponsored by Sena-
tor Robert C. Smith, a Republican from New Hampshire. Id.
300. Retroactive liability applies to CERCLA's creation of new obligations for situ-
ations which have occurred in the past. Black's Law Dictionary 684 (5th ed. 1983)
(defining retroactive law). The issue of retroactive liability is the most controversial
of the issues being debated in the Superfund reform process. See Julia A. Solo, Com-
ment, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers to Redevelopment and
Prospects for Change, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 285, 292-94 (1995).
301. In the joint and several liability scheme, if the environmental harm is indivisi-
ble, each PRP is liable for the entire cost of the cleanup. 1 Topol & Snow, supra note
103, at 10. The government may pick which party or parties to sue, and those parties
may recover from other PRPs in private actions. Id.
302. Protracted litigation over cleanups and the costs associated with that litigation
has always been a major criticism of CERCLA. See Don J. DeBenedictis, How
Superfund Money is Spent, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 30 ("[A] mere 12 percent of the
money spent by insurance companies goes toward actually cleaning up hazardous
wastes. The remaining 88 percent is spent on litigating claims and administration ....
[I]nsurance companies spent about $410 million on Superfund transaction costs in
1989, the last year studied.").
303. See infra notes 319-25 and accompanying text. Two courts have suggested that
legislative reform is appropriate to relieve the inequity that a strict interpretation of
section 113(h) creates. In this vein, the Third Circuit indicated that, because Congress
was aware of how strictly courts are interpreting section 113(h), the remedy for the
inequity this interpretation creates should be left to the legislature. Boarhead Corp. v.
Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991). In Hanford Downwinders Coalition v.
Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1482 (9th Cir. 1995), the court refused to grant jurisdiction to
hear a health-based challenge to the EPA-selected removal action. The Ninth Circuit
felt constrained because Congress did not authorize a health-related exception to the
general jurisdictional bar. Id. at 1478. The district court had previously refused to
grant review because, "[diespite this clear awareness that citizen suits were subject to
the timing of review restrictions of section 113(h), Congress provided no exception to
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The Accelerated Cleanup and Environmental Restoration Act (S.
1285) proposed in September 1995 and amended on March 21, 1996,
would have allowed for judicial review of certain required removal or
remedial actions immediately after signing the Record of Decision.3 °0
The review would occur directly after the public comment period for
the selected remedy, and before cleanup actually begins. It adds a
sixth method 315 through which a remedial plan may be challenged
under section 113(h), but only grants review of a remedial action with
a projected cost of more than $15 million.3 6 This grant of jurisdiction
is broad and overinclusive because it represents too great a compro-
mise on the goal of CERCLA to clean up quickly. The exception
would allow PRPs to bring suits based on monetary harm, and would
even allow citizen suits where irreparable harm was not alleged, so
long as the remedial project was valued at over $15 million. PRPs
could use this provision to stall every large-scale cleanup even if that
cleanup was in the best interests of the community, as the only prereq-
uisite to gaining judicial review is the $15 million threshold. S. 1285
was criticized by Christine 0. Gregoire, Washington State Attorney
General, who testified in front of the Committee on Environment and
Public Works on behalf of the National Association of Attorneys
General (NAAG), as the chair of its Environment and Energy Com-
mittee.30 7 Her greatest concern was that such a provision gives PRPs
a potential avenue to stall cleanups: 308
This provision is particularly disturbing given the many new
grounds the bill creates for challenging a remedial action. In addi-
tion, this provision will invite disputes over whether the projected
costs exceed $15 million. The provision will effectively place a pri-
ority on litigation rather than cleanup and potentially delay cleanup
at these sites for years.30 9
section 113(h) for health related claims." Hanford Downwinders Coalition v. Dowdle,
841 F. Supp. 1050, 1062 (E.D. Wash. 1993).
304. S. 1285, 104th Cong. (1995). The sixth method of review would be created by
language added to section 129: "(c) Judicial Review. Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of this Act or any other law, an approval or disapproval of a remedial action
plan the implementation of which is projected to cost more than $15,000,000 shall be
final action of the Administrator subject to judicial review in United States district
court." Id § 404.
305. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the five ex-
isting exceptions.
306. S. 1285, § 404.
307. Hearings Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works on S. 1285,
104th Cong. 695 (1996) (statement of Christine 0. Gregoire, Washington State Attor-
ney General).
308. Id at 700.
309. Id. The remainder of Gregoire's testimony on pre-enforcement review states:
The bill partially eliminates from current law the prohibition on pre-enforce-
ment review of remedy decisions, allow'ing pre-enforcement judicial review
of remedial actions projected to cost more than S15 million. This amend-
ment would allow responsible parties, as well as environmental groups and
other interested persons, to challenge the selection and implementation of a
1998] 1973
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
In response to comments such as those of Gregoire, the Senate intro-
duced a subsequent bill which reverted back to the present statute's
complete ban on pre-enforcement review.3 10 This bill, named the
"Superfund Cleanup Acceleration Act of 1997," was praised by
NAAG for its retention of the pre-enforcement review ban.311 It was
criticized in the same hearing, however, by the American Petroleum
Institute (API).312 The API suggested that provisions should be made
to allow some type of pre-enforcement review.313
The most recent House of Representatives bill to reauthorize
Superfund is House Rule 2500.31 4 This proposal would eliminate the
bar on pre-enforcement review completely.315 It is similar to the Sen-
ate bill in that it adds a sixth opportunity under section 113(h) to chal-
lenge a cleanup plan.316 The challenge may be made immediately
after signing the Record of Decision, but there is no threshold dollar
amount to satisfy.317 This would, in effect, allow a PRP to challenge
any cleanup order, for monetary or other reasons, from the moment it
became finalized. It, like S. 1285, revises the current complete ban too
broadly. 318
These current congressional proposals to lift the ban on pre-en-
forcement review are overinclusive and do not squarely address the
possibility of irreparable harm. Instead, they simply address chal-
lenges based on liability or cost. This is especially true of S. 1285,
which only allows review for the most costly remedial plans.3 19 The
factual situations revealed in Princeton Gamma-Tech and Clinton
County, however, were not based on parties challenging liability or
the costliness of the selected remedy. Instead, the plaintiffs in both
argued that the selected remedy would cause irreparable harm to their
remedial action once the remedial alternative has been selected. This provi-
sion represents a radical change from current law, which has generally
worked quite well.
Id.
310. S. 8, 105th Cong. (1997).
311. Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings on S. 8 Before the Subcomm. on
Superfund, Waste Control and Risk Assessment of the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee, 105th Cong. 33 (1997), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst
File, (statement of Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico).
312. Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings on S. 8 Before the Subcomm. on
Superfimd, Waste Control and Risk Assessment of the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee, 105th Cong. 1 (1997), available in 1997 WL 196886 (statement of
Larry L. Lockner).
313. Id. at 14-15. API's likely motivations for allowing some pre-enforcement re-
view do not coincide with those of citizens groups. Indeed, API's motivations are
probably exactly those which the ban on pre-enforcement review are intended to pre-
vent (i.e., lengthy litigation to postpone expenditures for cleaning up a site).
314. H.R. 2500, 104th Cong. (1995).
315. Id. § 114.
316. Id.
317. See id.
318. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
319. S. 1285, 104th Cong. (1995).
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health and to the environment.320 This type of challenge is rare. In-
deed, only a handful have been made in the twelve years since section
113(h) was added to CERCLA.321
CERCLA should not be amended to include a provision for judicial
review in the above circumstances. 322 Equity suggests that judicial
discretion, and not legislation, is appropriate in this situation: One
situation in which "it is not inconsistent with legislative supremacy for
a judge to interpret a statute dynamically" arises "when... statutory
or constitutional meta-policies suggest a narrowing interpretation." 323
Judicial discretion in this context accounts for the fact that "there are
certain meta-principles that underlie legislative activity. True defer-
ence to legislative supremacy will strive to effectuate these underlying
principles. 324 It is enough, therefore, that the legislature considers
the probabilities of an inequitable situation occurring, and upon deter-
mining that such a probability is low, creates a blanket prohibition.
The court may then step in and remedy the situation if strict adher-
ence to the plain language of the statute would conflict with the un-
derlying legislative purpose.32 Silecchia's solution is inappropriate
320. United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1994), over-
ruled by Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997); Clinton
County Comm'rs, 116 F.3d at 1020.
321. See Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d at 144 (noting that "none of the Courts of
Appeals were [previously] confronted with bona fide assertions of irreparable envi-
ronmental damage").
322. See Healy, supra note 8, at 95 (indicating that "Congress will likely conclude
that it is impossible to legislate prospectively a rule capable of accommodating all of
the competing statutory policies at issue").
323. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. L.J. 319, 330
(1989).
324. Id at 344; cf. Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the
Regulatory State 114-15 (1990) ("[Tjhe significance of congressional enactments nec-
essarily depends on background norms about how words should be understood, and
those norms are rarely supplied by the legislature itself.... [I]n easy as well as hard
cases, courts must resort to background assumptions if interpretation is to proceed.").
325. See supra note 322. Commentators support this view, and have noted that the
courts are becoming more important in settling such disputes in the environmental
arena. Jacqueline Switzer, an associate professor of political science at Southern Ore-
gon State College in Ashland, wrote a good summary of the political process involved
in protecting the environment, and why the courts are becoming more important in
that process:
Even though Congress holds the constitutional responsibility for enacting
legislation to protect the environment, the Department of the Interior and
the Environmental Protection Agency are the two leading agencies in the
development of environmental policy. Their ability to protect the environ-
ment is affected, to a large extent, by their resources. The level of presiden-
tial support has been among the most important factors that determines how
effective environmental agencies will be.... The protection of the environ-
ment has been a priority when it has been a focus of the president and his staff
and has slipped when other interests have come first. Many observers believe
the judicial arena is taking on new importance in the settling of environmen-
tal disputes, especially by environmental organizations and individuals frus-
trated by the slow pace of administrative rulemaking.
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for this extraordinary situation, because her solution calls for a con-
gressional revision of CERCLA to remedy the lack of judicial review
in cases where irreparable harm is alleged.
2. Technical Determinations are More Appropriate for the EPA
A second problem with Silecchia's solution is that it asks judges to
make highly technical determinations regarding the effects of pro-
posed remedial plans.326 This is a weighing of alternatives that, pre-
sumably, the EPA has already done.327 Silecchia herself notes that her
proposal "will undoubtedly create some difficult questions for the
courts. It may also put them in the unenviable position of having to
decide whether there is ever a harm to human health that can be
deemed to be anything but serious. '3 28 Chief Judge David L. Bazelon
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has articulated the discomfort judges feel when required to review
complex and disputed scientific information. He explained that "the
courts are not the proper forum 'either to resolve the factual disputes,
or to make the painful value choices' on technical and scientific is-
sues." 329 Courts generally should defer to the scientific knowledge of
the EPA in such situations.33 ° Comparatively, the EPA has much
more scientific expertise than the reviewing judge.331 Courts also de-
fer to the EPA because the subject matter being reviewed is of a
highly technical nature.332 Additionally, the EPA's decisions are
based in part on policy choices, which are legislative judgments, and
Switzer, supra note 35, at 69 (emphasis added).
326. Silecchia, supra note 13, at 385 n.209.
327. See id. at 385 n.211.
328. Id. at 385 n.209.
329. Jane McCarthy, Negotiating Settlements: A Guide to Environmental Media-
tion 55 (1984) (quoting Chief Judge Bazelon speaking before a conference of the
Atomic Industrial Forum).
330. The Princeton Gamma-Tech court noted that
a reviewing court should give deference to the scientific expertise of the
agency. This is not a circumstance where a court is called upon to simply
acquiesce in a determination of law; rather, this is a situation where an ad-
ninistrative agency does possess expert knowledge in a factual and scientific
field.
United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1994), overruled by
Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Charles D.
Case. Problems in Judicial Review Arising from the Use of Computer Models and
Other Quantitative Methodologies in Environmental Decisionmaking, 10 B.C. Envtl.
Aff. L. Rev. 251, 293-303 (1982) (suggesting that lack of expertise on the part of
judges, lack of judicial access to technical resources to assist in the analysis of the
technical issues involved in such decisions, limits on the court's ability to supplement
or go outside the record, and the traditional deference to which the courts give to
administrative decisions are rationales which contribute to the difficulties of judicial
review in environmental cases).
331. Case, supra note 330, at 297.
332. Id. at 298-99. Case suggests that the more complex or technical the subject
matter at issue, the more likely judges are to defer to in-depth review by agencies. Id.
at 299.
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"not susceptible to the same type of verification or refutation by refer-
ence to the record as are some factual questions."3 33 Generally, we
should not encourage courts to second guess the EPA, especially given
that most of the EPA's decisions are appropriate. 3-'
Silecchia's solution calls for judicial review of too many of the
EPA's technical determinations. It asks judges to make tough techni-
cal determinations.335 It is clear, however, that her solution does not
open the floodgates to potential cleanup-stalling litigation by PRPs,
because its requirements for injunctive relief are strict. 336 This type of
solution, based on the Princeton Gammna-Tech decision, is feared by
the EPA.33 7 The EPA believes that expansive judicial review would
undermine their ability to clean up hazardous waste sites promptly
and effectively. 338 More limited review would not undermine the
EPA's capability to perform its duties.
3. Balancing the Irreparable Harm
The third problem with Silecchia's approach is that it allows a judge
to grant an injunction, stopping implementation of the cleanup pro-
cess, even if failure to immediately implement the cleanup plan would
cause greater irreparable harm than the planned cleanup itself.339 For
example, consider the hypothetical situation posed at the beginning of
this Note.' Burning the contaminated soil, while dangerous, may be
less dangerous than any other available cleanup method, and less dan-
gerous than leaving the solvents in the soil while reformulating the
cleanup plan. While burning the soil would cause irreparable harm, it
may be the only way to avoid greater irreparable harm caused by the
alternatives available. Silecchia's plan would allow an injunction to
333. ld at 300 (quoting Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C.
Cir. 1974)).
334. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. Dean Frederick Schauer of the
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University suggests another rea-
son to resist asking judges to make such technical determinations. Frederick Schauer,
Judicial Incentives and the Design of Legal Institutions 16 (Aug. 31, 1997) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with Fordhanm Law Review). He posits that the behavior of
judges is affected by their reputations within their peer groups. Id. "If trial judges will
be scorned as ambitious slackers or free-riders by their fellow trial judges in the same
multi-member court if they... [do not spend] enough time moving the docket along,
then this might affect their behavior." Id Under this view, a district court judge faced
with an irreparable harm claim in a citizen suit will opt to dismiss the suit under
section 113(h)'s timing of review provision rather than undertake a suit which will
involve a painstaking review of technical and scientific matters, of which the judge
probably has little knowledge. See Case, supra note 330, at 299-300. Thus, Case sug-
gests that judicial deference is in part based on administrative convenience. Id. at 299.
335. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 290-96 and accompanying text.
337. Superfund Remedy Challenge, Pesticide & Toxic Chem. News, Nov. 9, 1994,
available in 1994 WL 3219349.
338. Id.
339. See Silecchia, supra note 13, at 385-86.
340. See supra Introduction.
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stop the cleanup in that situation, because the plaintiff "can allege in
good faith that the nature of the cleanup plan in place will, if contin-
ued as ordered, create an (1) irremediable; (2) serious; (3) non-specu-
lative threat to either human health and safety or to the natural
environment. ' 341 It is possible that the cleanup plan would cause ir-
reparable harm, satisfying the above conditions, but that leaving the
site in its current condition while reformulating a cleanup plan would
cause even more serious irreparable damage. Her test fails to con-
sider this situation.342
C. Refining the Irreparable Harm-Based Solution
While the basis for Silecchia's solution is sound, it leaves several
problems unsolved. In addition to the problems noted in the critique
above, an inherent problem exists in asking a judge to grant an injunc-
tion against the EPA: judicial reliance on EPA decisions. This section
describes that problem in further detail, and proposes that pre-en-
forcement review under section 113(h) is appropriate in cases where
the plaintiff can allege both irreparable harm and a conflict of interest
within the EPA that sheds doubt on the sincerity of its cleanup deci-
sion. The proposed solution, like Silecchia's solution, requires a plain-
tiff to make bona fide allegations of irreparable harm.343 The solution
further requires allegations that an EPA conflict of interest was a fac-
tor in their selecting the cleanup plan.344 This factor should solve the
judicial reliance problem and the EPA's floodgates concern. Finally,
the solution advocates strict use of sanctions for frivolous lawsuits so
that PRPs do not use this exception to delay performing the remedial
measures.
345
1. Relief Sought for this Type of Injury
The compromising behavior by top EPA and White House officials
discussed in part I.B. suggests an additional factor to narrow
Silecchia's test. That behavior renders highly questionable the failure
of courts facing subject matter jurisdiction problems under section
113(h) to evaluate considerations for granting preliminary injunctions,
because the EPA's decisions may have been tainted by a conflict of
interest. In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction,
courts consider (1) the harm involved; (2) the manner in which the
341. Silecchia, supra note 13, at 385 (citations omitted).
342. While this type of determination is also beyond judicial competence, see supra
part IV.B.2, it is important that it is a requirement for judicial review. If the parties
cannot make bona fide allegations that there is a safer cleanup alternative, a court
should not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
343. See infra Part IV.C.1.
344. See infra Part IV.C.2.
345. See infra Part IV.C.3.
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harm is to be inflicted; and (3) the motivations for the infliction? 6
Generally, the enjoined party's conduct must be egregious and unfair
to award an injunction." 7 An injunction may be necessary, however,
under conditions similar to those present in the hypothetical situation
described in the Introduction of this Note.
The type of injury alleged in this scenario is irreparable harm to
public health.'1 Such harm is substantial and should be addressed
while it can be, before it is irrevocably inflicted.319 The Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania recognized generally in Cabot Corp. v. EPA that,
by the time post-implementation review finally becomes available, the
threatened damage to human health and the environment already
may have occurred.350
The injury is inflicted through a remedial program designed to do
the exact opposite of the alleged harm, that is, to clean up a dangerous
environmental situation. If the situation is dangerous enough to war-
rant EPA attention by placing the site on the National Priorities
List,351 the corresponding danger posed by the remedial method
should also be worthy of considerable attention. This is one of the
reasons that Congress enacted a citizen suit in the first instance-to
provide a check on EPA conduct when citizens neighboring the toxic
area are unsatisfied by the EPA's efforts.35
2. Adding a Conflict of Interest Requirement
In a situation where the EPA is trying to implement a remedial pro-
gram to clean up the environment, the EPA's motivations should not
generally be suspect. A review of past EPA conduct, however, shows
346. See Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 862 F.2d 890, 892 (1st Cir. 1988); Deanne M.
Wilson & Michael S. Haratz, Equity's Slippery Slope: Irreparable Injury, NJ. Law.,
Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 9-10.
347. Wilson & Haratz, supra note 346, at 10.
348. See Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1020 (3d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied sub nom. Arrest the Incinerator Remediation, Inc. v. EPA, 118 S. Ct. 687
(1998); United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, 31 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1994), over-
ruled by Clinton County Conmni'rs, 116 F.3d at 1018.
349. In this vein, Healy remarked:
However, the approach to the exception discussed below [only allowing re-
view after part of the cleanup is completed] shows that allowving review only
after a stage of the cleanup has been completed is problematic when there is
a health basis for the citizens suit claim: a court will be unable to prevent the
threatened harm if the harmful phase of the remedial plan has already been
implemented at the time of review.
Healy, supra note 8, at 41.
350. Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. Supp. 823, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
351. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
352. H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 267 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2941-42 ("To eliminate unnecessary litigation, the ... amendment establishes
public participation procedures which will allow all interested persons... to advise
the Administrator concerning the nature and scope of the remedial action plans...
including notice and a reasonable opportunity for comment on the proposed remedial
action plan.").
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that conflicts of interest may arise that shift EPA motivations from
cleanup to politics or economic gain.353 As noted above, one such
conflict of interest was the unconscionable behavior of Superfund Ad-
ministrator Rita Lavelle. 54 She had considerable influence over the
decisions made regarding the cleanup of a site in which one of the
major responsible parties was her past employer.355 This type of con-
flict of interest raises concerns that the EPA may implement less
costly and under-protective remedial methods where such a conflict
exists, instead of methods that are most protective of public health.
Simply put, an agency such as the EPA is bound to be swayed politi-
cally, which makes blind reliance on their policy decisions in the face
of irreparable harm suspect.
356
The exception created by Princeton Gamma-Tech and modified by
Silecchia was actually a limited safeguard for the environment, only
appropriate in a relatively narrow factual situation.357 The solution
proposed by this Note is even more narrow, and limits the possibility
for abuse by PRPs. Courts and commentators inaccurately character-
ized the Princeton Gamma-Tech exception as a possible opening of
the floodgates for PRPs to delay incurring liability costs by judicial
challenges.358 In response to the "floodgates" concern,3 59 Silecchia's
proposal to modify section 113(h) could be limited even further. First,
while it is clear that the EPA may make mistakes at times, or fail to
consider certain factors in their analysis of remedial methods, such
actions are difficult to criticize from a technical perspective.3 60 The
courts understandably tend to defer to the EPA's expertise in select-
353. See supra Part I.B.
354. EPA Officials, supra note 37, at A16; see supra notes 40-45 and accompanying
text.
355. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
357. See Silecchia, supra note 13, at 381 (indicating that, because the decision is so
closely tailored to the facts of the case, the ruling is potentially limited in scope).
358. See Clinton County Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1024-25 (3d Cir. 1997),
cert. denied sub nom. Arrest the Incinerator Remediation, Inc. v. EPA, 118 S. Ct. 687
(1998); McConnell, supra note 175, at 132. McConnell cites five possible negative
impacts of the Princeton Gamma-Tech decision:
(1) "Undoubtedly, PRPs will seize upon this new opportunity to tangle the EPA in
litigation." Id.
(2) "[W]ith a new method by which to challenge the EPA there is a likelihood, if not a
certainty, that there will be an increase in the number of challenges to EPA actions
prior to their completion." Id.
(3) "[T]hese new 'irreparable harm' challenges will require factual findings to deter-
mine whether the EPA's chosen plan of clean-up will indeed exacerbate rather than
remedy the problem."
(4) "PRPs will have increased bargaining power as they negotiate with the EPA." Id.
at 133
(5) "IT]he granting of pre-enforcement review negates the purpose of the timing of
review provision." Id.
359. See supra notes 336-38 and accompanying text.
360. See Case, supra note 330, at 298.
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ing remedial methods.361  Arguments regarding which remedial
method is more effective or more efficient are properly relegated to
the notice and comment period, when the EPA considers the public's
response to the proposed remedial method.362 The court should not
step in and make decisions about science when technically-informed
parties already had the opportunity to do so. Indeed, in the vast ma-
jority of cases, the EPA does a good job balancing efficiency and effec-
tiveness, and makes just decisions.
Judicial interference is more proper, however, in extraordinary situ-
ations where the EPA is acting under improper political influence.36
This type of situation would occur if the EPA were to select a reme-
dial plan that would cause irreparable harm to public health, and to
have chosen that plan because of a conflict of interest-the type of
situation described at the beginning of this Note.3" 4 The court must be
able to step in and remedy any harm caused by such a conflict of inter-
est.365 The parties are no longer just arguing that one remedial plan is
better than the other, which they already had an opportunity to do in
the notice and comment period.366 Instead, the plaintiffs are alleging
that a conflict of interest tainted the selection of the remedial plan.
They are, in effect, saying that the conflict of interest caused the EPA
official to disregard the possible irreparable harm that the remedial
361. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984) (holding that courts should defer to agency decisions which implicate their
specific areas of expertise where congressional intent is unclear).
362. See Healey, supra note 8, at 8. Before the pursuit of any remedial action, the
EPA must publish notice of the proposed remediation plan and must make the full
plan available to the public, as required by section 117. 42 U.S.C. § 9617(a), (b)
(1994). The EPA must then give the public a "reasonable opportunity for submission
of written and oral comments." Id. § 9617(a). CERCLA also requires public notice of
the final remedial action plan, which must also be available for review by the public.
Id § 9617(b).
363. See supra notes 354-55 and accompanying text.
364. See supra Introduction.
365. See Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. Non-Contributory Pension Plan for Salaried
Employees, 757 F. Supp. 1434 (E.D. Pa. 1991). In Kotrosits, salaried employees were
denied unreduced early retirement benefits upon sale of a subsidiary. Id. The district
court noted that the pension plan conferred discretion on the Benefits Committee to
determine whether benefits are payable. Id. at 1456. The court concluded, however,
that "the unique circumstances of th[e] case" involved a conflict of interest that made
deference to the committee inappropriate and required a searching judicial review of
the committee's determination. Id The court identified the conflict of interest as
follows:
[Tihe fact that the denial affected a large number of employees and resulted
in estimated savings of at least two million dollars for the Plan undermines
the rationale for deferential review. The larger the expenditure, the greater
the possibility that the sponsor vill eventually have to replenish the Plan's
funds.
Id. at 1456 (citation omitted). CERCLA, like the plan in Kotrosits, confers discretion
on the EPA to determine which cleanup plan to select. See supra notes 103-05 and
accompanying text. By analogy, a conflict of interest involved in selecting the cleanup
plan makes judicial review appropriate, and deference to the EPA less appropriate.
366. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
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action will cause them. Such an extraordinarily inequitable situation
should not be allowed to occur simply because it was not contem-
plated by the legislature upon CERCLA's creation.
A similar type of test is employed in bankruptcy proceedings, where
some courts have held that a debtor, to obtain an injunction against
the continuation of an administrative proceeding, must establish that
the administrative agency acted in bad faith.367 One strength of such a
"bad faith" test is that it gives deference to the decisions of adminis-
trative agencies.36 Implicit in the "bad faith" test is the requirement
that the debtor must prove irreparable harm, since irreparable harm is
required for granting a preliminary injunction. 369 One commentator
suggests that a model test to determine whether such bankruptcy pro-
ceedings should be enjoined contains both these requirements: a
showing of extraordinary circumstances, and irreparable harm.370 The
extraordinary circumstances would include bad faith and bias.37' A
showing that the agency has a pecuniary interest in the litigation, for
example, would suffice to show bias. 72
The hypothetical situation provided at the beginning of this Note373
hinted at some of the factors appropriate for a court to consider when
determining if the EPA-selected remedial action is tainted with undue
political influence. In that hypothetical, the EPA ordered a PRP to
burn solvent-contaminated soil at the site of its abandoned chemical
plant. The EPA official supervising the cleanup at the site maintained
a financial relationship with the company owning the hazardous waste
incinerator that would be used in the planned cleanup process. Courts
could consider the relationship of the EPA official with the PRPs or
other interested parties. If the official has some personal or financial
interest in the responsible parties' affairs or the affairs of the waste
contractors,374 there is a likelihood that the interest could have cre-
367. Carlos J. Cuevas, Bankruptcy Code Section 105(a) Injunctions and State and
Local Administrative and Civil Enforcement Proceedings, 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev.
365, 377 (1996). The leading case involving the bad faith test is In re National Hospi-
tal & Institutional Builders Co. v. Goldstein, 658 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving a
trustee who was denied regulatory approval to sell a debtor's nursing home in Staten
Island, New York, to a Hasidic Jewish organization).
368. Cuevas, supra note 367, at 378-79.
369. Id. at 379.
370. Id. at 382.
371. Id. at 385-87. Requiring extraordinary circumstances would prevent unneces-
sary preemption of the legitimate actions of the agency. Id. at 385.
372. Id. at 387. Such a bias was found by the court in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564 (1973), where the plaintiffs were optometrists and had been charged with unpro-
fessional conduct by the state licensing board because they were employed by corpo-
rations. Id. at 564. The members of the state disciplinary committee were all self-
employed optometrists. Id. The Court held that the members of the state disciplinary
board had a pecuniary interest in the litigation because revocation of the plaintiffs'
licenses would have reduced competition. Id. at 578.
373. See supra Introduction.
374. Id.
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ated bias in the remedy-selection process. This type of relationship
occurred in the above hypothetical between the EPA official and the
hazardous waste contractor. The official could also have ties with in-
dustry-wide groups and associations, as did EPA Deputy Administra-
tor Robert Sussman, through his previous work for the Chemical
Manufacturer's Association.375
The likelihood of bias is increased by the extent of the official's par-
ticipation in selecting the remedial plan and the extent of the official's
personal or financial interest. Additionally, courts should consider
whether external pressures have been applied to the official. Contact
with other EPA or White House officials that have personal or finan-
cial interests with the parties may indicate such external pressure.376
Such external pressures were applied to Superfund administrator Rita
Lavelle during the Stringfellow Acid Pits project.3" Evidence showed
that Lavelle had extensive, unexplained contacts with the White
House during the politically-motivated withholding of Superfund
grant money.3 78 Plaintiffs must be careful, however, not to make alle-
gations of this type of behavior casually. The next section describes
appropriate punishment for non-bona fide allegations of both conflicts
of interest and irreparable harm.
3. Sanctions as an Additional Safeguard
Some commentators disfavor allowing any type of pre-enforcement
review, claiming it will open up the floodgates to claims specifically
tailored to meet the judicially-carved exception to section 113(h). For
example, the somewhat sarcastic introduction to a recent article writ-
ten about the Princeton Gamma-Tech decision stated:
Attention all PRP's! Now all you have to do in the Third Circuit to
get pre-enforcement review is allege "irreparable harm" to the envi-
ronment. If you establish irreparable harm to the environment you
may be entitled to injunctive relief. Even if you don't, you can tie
the EPA up in prolonged litigation. Heck its [sic] worth a shot; and
it's all in the name of saving the environment!379
The existence of an exception to the section 113(h) ban on pre-en-
forcement review, however, does not guarantee that courts will enter-
tain any claim framed in terms of that exception. Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to grant sanctions
against a party that presents claims for any "improper purpose," in-
cluding unnecessary delay.3s The Seventh Circuit, in North Shore
375. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
376. See EPA Officials, supra note 37, at A16.
377. See Thornton, supra note 43, at Al.
378. See EPA Officials, supra note 37, at A16.
379. McConnell, supra note 175, at 115.
380. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; see also Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 444 (9th
Cir. 1995) (stating that Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 "provides that a district court may sanction
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Gas Co. v. EPA,381 considered similar sanctions for a claim alleging
irreparable harm if the EPA-ordered remedial method was per-
formed.382 In that case, the court found that there was some
probability that North Shore Gas Co. would suffer irreparable harm
from the EPA's action, and did not issue sanctions.383 The case shows,
however, that courts are willing to consider whether the irreparable
harm claim is frivolous, and to award sanctions in appropriate situa-
tions to deter the filing of frivolous claims. Use of these types of sanc-
tions will promote the proper use of the judicially-carved exception to
section 113(h) described above.
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit was on the right track when it created an excep-
tion to the section 113(h) ban in Princeton Gamma-Tech. While the
exception it carved out may have been too broad, it was workable and
ready for refining. The Clinton County court had an opportunity to
narrow that exception but, instead, completely closed off the route to
pre-enforcement review. The basic failure of the Clinton County deci-
sion was the court's strong reliance on the EPA. It failed to consider
that the EPA may have selected a remedial plan that was improper
due to a mistake, oversight or, more importantly, a conflict of interest.
Congress may remedy this situation by revising CERCLA to grant
some limited type of judicial review. The congressional solutions as
currently framed, however, fail because they are as broad as the
Princeton Gamma-Tech exception. 3" A better approach is for the
courts to recognize the inequities of this situation, and grant relief if
the above-proposed test is met. The courts must avoid foreclosing re-
view in the rare situations where the process has broken down, EPA
officials are the bad actors, and the EPA has improperly selected re-
medial methods based on conflicts of interest. When remedies se-
lected in such a manner will cause irreparable health harms to the
public, foreclosing review is inequitable and, more importantly, con-
trary to CERCLA's goal of protecting both the environment and
human health.
attorneys or parties who submit pleadings for an improper purpose or that contain
frivolous arguments or arguments that have no evidentiary support").
381. 930 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1991).
382. Id. at 1245-46. In North Shore, the EPA argued that North Shore Gas Co.
should be sanctioned under Fed. R. App. P. 38 for taking a frivolous appeal. Id. After
careful consideration, the court denied the request for sanctions. Id.
383. Id.
384. See supra notes 304-16 and accompanying text.
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